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Abstract
Policy analysis has long been a main interest of Clive Granger￿ s. Here, we present a
framework for economic policy analysis that provides a novel integration of several funda-
mental concepts at the heart of Granger￿ s contributions to time-series analysis. We work
with a dynamic structural system analyzed by White and Lu (2010) with well de￿ned causal
meaning; under suitable conditional exogeneity restrictions, Granger causality coincides with
this structural notion. The system contains target and control subsystems, with possibly in-
tegrated or cointegrated behavior. We ensure the invariance of the target subsystem to
policy interventions using an explicitly causal partial equilibrium recursivity condition. Pol-
icy e⁄ectiveness is ensured by another explicit causality condition. These properties only
involve the data generating process; models play a subsidiary role. Our framework thus
complements that of of Ericsson, Hendry, and Mizon (1998) (EHM) by providing conditions
for policy analysis alternative to weak, strong, and super-exogeneity. This makes possible
policy analysis for systems that may fail EHM￿ s conditions. It also facilitates analysis of the
cointegrating properties of systems subject to policymaker control. We discuss a variety of
practical procedures useful for analyzing such systems and illustrate with an application to
a simple model of the U.S. macroeconomy.
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1 Introduction
Although just three of Clive Granger￿ s many papers explicitly focus on aspects of policy analysis
(Granger, 1973; Granger, 1988; and Granger and Deutsch, 1992), a central and long-standing
concern evident throughout his work is that econometric theory and practice should be infor-
mative and useful to policymakers. In this paper, we further this objective by providing a novel
1framework for economic policy analysis that blends together a number of concepts at the heart
of Granger￿ s contributions to time-series econometrics: causality, exogeneity, cointegration, and
model speci￿cation.
Our starting point is a dynamic structural system with potentially cointegrated variables
analyzed by White and Lu (2010) (WL) within which causal meanings are well de￿ned. This
system contains target and control subsystems, with possibly integrated or cointegrated behav-
ior. We ensure the invariance of the target subsystem to policy interventions, obviating the
Lucas critique, using an explicitly causal partial equilibrium recursivity condition. Policy e⁄ec-
tiveness is ensured by another explicit causality requirement. Causal e⁄ects are identi￿ed by
a conditional form of exogeneity. These e⁄ects can be consistently estimated with a correctly
speci￿ed model.
Following WL, we show that, given conditional exogeneity, Granger causality is equivalent
to structural causality. On the other hand, given structural non-causality, Granger causality
is equivalent to failure of conditional exogeneity. In this sense, Granger causality is not a
fundamental system property requisite for reliable policy analysis, but an important consequence
of necessary underlying structural properties.
By relying only on correct model speci￿cation and not weak exogeneity or its extensions
(strong and superexogeneity), our framework complements the policy analytic framework of
Ericsson, Hendry, and Mizon (1998) (EHM). Although giving up weak exogeneity may lead to
loss of estimator e¢ ciency, it also makes possible policy analysis for systems that may fail EHM￿ s
conditions (see Fisher, 1993). As we also show, our approach readily lends itself to analysis of the
structural consequences of a variety of control rules that the policymaker may employ. Among
other things, we ￿nd that proportional (P) control cannot modify the cointegrating properties
of a target system, whereas proportional-integral (PI) control can. In fact, PI control can
introduce, eliminate, or broadly modify the cointegrating properties of the uncontrolled target
system. Whereas cointegration between target variables and policy instruments is possible but
unusual with P control, PI control can easily induce causal cointegration between the target
variables (Yt) and the policy instruments (￿Zt).
The control mode also has interesting implications for estimation, inference, and speci￿cation
testing in controlled systems. P control or a certain mode of PI control yields ￿Zt ￿ I(0);
resulting in standard inference. Other modes of PI control yield ￿Zt ￿ I(1); the theory of Park
and Phillips (1988, 1989) may be applied to these cases.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the data generating process
(DGP) for the controlled system we study here, together with notions of structural causality
and policy interventions natural in these systems. Our causal notions enable us to formulate
2causal restrictions, essential for reliable policy analysis, that obviate the Lucas critique and that
ensure policy e⁄ectiveness. Section 3 discusses a conditional form of exogeneity that serves to
identify causal e⁄ects of interest and that forges links between structural causality and Granger
causality. Section 4 reviews properties of cointegrated systems relevant here, with particular
attention to their structural and causal content.
In Section 5, we give an explicit comparison of our framework with that of EHM, summarizing
their similarities and di⁄erences and commenting on their relative merits. Section 6 analyzes
the structural consequences of various rules that may be employed by policymakers to control
potentially cointegrated systems. We pay particular attention there to how the policy rules
may introduce, modify, or eliminate cointegration within the target system and to the possible
cointegrating relations that may hold between policy instruments and target variables, or among
the policy instruments. Section 7 discusses econometric considerations that arise in empirically
analyzing potentially cointegrated controlled systems and o⁄ers useful practical procedures and
diagnostics. Section 8 illustrates these methods with an application to a simple model of the
U.S. macroeconomy, and Section 9 contains a summary and concluding remarks.
In what follows, we often refer to processes "integrated of order d;" I(d) processes for short.
By this we mean a stochastic process that becomes I(0) when di⁄erenced d times, where an I(0)
process is one that obeys the functional central limit theorem.
2 The DGP, Structural Causality, Policy Interventions, and Recursivity
2.1 The DGP and Structural Causality
We begin by specifying the data generating process (DGP). For concreteness, clarity, and to
a⁄ord maximum comparability to EHM, we mainly work with a linear N￿variate structural






= ￿0 + A1Xt￿1 + A2Xt￿2 + "t; t = 1;2;:::; (1)
where Yt represents observable "target" or "non-policy" variables1 and Zt represents observable
"policy instruments" or "control variables" that may be useful for controlling Yt: Both Yt and
Zt are vectors, N1 ￿ 1 and N2 ￿ 1 respectively. Thus, N = N1 + N2: The vector ￿0 ￿ (￿0
10;￿0
20)0
includes intercepts and any deterministic trend components. (See EHM, eq.(4).) We partition
1We follow EHM in referring to Yt as "target" variables. This should not be confused with similar nomenclature
appearing elsewhere in the literature, where "target series" means a sequence of desired values Y
￿
t for Yt or "policy
target" means a desired value for E(Yt) or some other aspect of Yt or its distribution. When, for convenience, we
refer simply to "targets" we always mean "target variables."






















As econometricians, we do not know the A￿ s, nor do we observe the random "shocks" "t =
("0
1t;"0
2t)0: Although ￿0; A1; and A2 may depend deterministically on t; we leave this implicit to
avoid further complicating the notation. We allow ￿0; A1; and A2 to generate unit root or other
nonstationary processes, with or without cointegration. It is convenient to think of fXtg being
(at most) I(1) as EHM do, but this is not essential.
By specifying that this is a structural system, we mean that it causally relates variables
on the right to variables on the left. For example, consider an intervention to Xt￿1, denoted
xt￿1 ! x￿
t￿1 and de￿ned as the pair (xt￿1;x￿
t￿1): Then the direct e⁄ect on Yt of the intervention
xt￿1 ! x￿
t￿1 at (xt￿1;xt￿2;et) is de￿ned as the di⁄erence
y￿
t ￿ yt = (￿10 + A11x￿
t￿1 + A12xt￿2 + et) ￿ (￿10 + A11xt￿1 + A12xt￿2 + et)
= A11(x￿
t￿1 ￿ xt￿1):
We see that A11 fully determines the direct e⁄ects on Yt of interventions to Xt￿1: Indeed, its
elements represent the direct e⁄ects of a one unit intervention to any given element of Xt￿1;
say xjt￿1 ! xjt￿1 + 1: Similarly, A12 fully determines the direct e⁄ects of interventions to
Xt￿2: We may therefore call A11 and A12 "matrices of e⁄ects." These concepts accord well with
intuition, and they are especially straightforward because of the linear structure. Similar notions
hold generally. See White and Chalak (2009) and WL for discussion of settable systems, which
provide causal foundations, relied on here, for the general case.
Using this notion of causality, we can say that if A112 = 0; then Zt￿1 does not structurally
cause2 Yt: Otherwise, Zt￿1 structurally causes Yt: If A112 = 0 and A122 = 0 then Zt￿1
t￿2 ￿
(Zt￿2;Zt￿1) does not structurally cause Yt: Without structural causality from policy variables
to target variables (i.e., without A112 6= 0 or A122 6= 0), policy cannot be e⁄ective. EHM (p.375)
make a parallel observation, but stated in terms of Granger causality. We provide further
comments below, when we relate structural causality to Granger causality, using the framework
of WL. Here, structural causality is the operating prerequisite.
2.2 Policy Interventions and Recursivity
For economic policy analysis, we need the concept of a policy intervention. The rough idea,
consistent with EHM, is that this is a change in the structure determining Zt: To be su¢ ciently
2This causality is direct causality, but we will leave this implicit.
4clear about how this works here, we posit an underlying "partial equilibrium" structure, com-
patible with the system (1). Although this leads us through some seemingly familiar territory,
there are some perhaps subtle, but nevertheless important twists along the way.
We write the partial equilibrium structure as
~ Yt = b1 + B10Zt + B11Xt￿1 + B12Xt￿2 + ￿1t
~ Zt = b2 + B20Yt + B21Xt￿1 + B22Xt￿2 + ￿2t; t = 1;2;::: . (2)
This resembles a familiar system of simultaneous equations, but, in line with conventions of
settable systems founded on the prescriptions of Strotz and Wold (1960), the right-hand side
(RHS) and left-hand side (LHS) variables are distinct, as "responses" ~ Yt and ~ Zt appear on the
left, whereas "settings" Yt and Zt (and their lags) appear on the right.
This seemingly minor notational di⁄erence re￿ ects an important feature of such structures:
they are not simultaneous, and thus avoid paradoxes associated with instantaneous causality
and feedback. Nevertheless, just as in classical simultaneous equations, each equation represents
the partial equilibrium and/or optimal joint response of the LHS variables to any admissible
con￿guration of the RHS variables. Thus, ~ Yt represents the (joint) outcome from whatever
subsystem determines ~ Yt; when faced with variables outside that subsystem set to admissible
values Zt; Xt￿1; Xt￿2; and ￿1t: The meaning of ~ Zt is similar. These responses are determined
in isolation, without permitting full equilibrium3, hence our designation "partial equilibrium."
Let B1 ￿ [b1;B10;B11;B12] and B2 ￿ [b2;B20;B21;B22]: We now de￿ne a structural change,
denoted Bj ! B￿
j (j = 1 or 2) as a pair (Bj;B￿
j) of structural coe¢ cients representing "old"
(Bj) and "new" (B￿
j) regimes. We also call structural changes "structural shifts." A policy
intervention, B2 ! B￿
2; is a structural change in the policy equation, i.e., that determining ~ Zt:
Our nomenclature is broadly consistent with that of Hendry and Massman (2006).
To specify the system￿ s response when all LHS variables are determined jointly, rather than
in isolation, we must specify how this joint determination is achieved. For this, we apply the
fundamental requirement of mutual consistency, necessary for equilibrium. In equilibrium, the
structure (2) satis￿es
~ Yt = b1 + B10 ~ Zt + B11Xt￿1 + B12Xt￿2 + ￿1t
~ Zt = b2 + B20~ Yt + B21Xt￿1 + B22Xt￿2 + ￿2t; t = 1;2;::: . (3)
Although this resembles a classical system of structural equations, we explicitly do not view
this as structural, because in the settable systems framework adopted here, structural rela-
3In settable systems language, partial equilibrium corresponds to the "agent partition," and full equilibrium
corresponds to the "global partition." The partitions specify mutually exclusive subsystems, each of whose vari-
ables respond freely and jointly to variables outside that subsystem. See White and Chalak (2009) for details.
5tions necessarily embody causality. Interpreting eq.(3) causally requires instantaneous feedback
(causality), and, consistent with Granger and Newbold￿ s (1986, p.221) position on instantaneous
feedback, settable systems do not allow this. Thus, eqs.(3) are not structural equations; instead
they only represent the mutual consistency conditions necessary for equilibrium. Eq.(2) is the
governing structural equation system.
If instantaneous feedback is ruled out, one must explain how mutual consistency can never-
theless be achieved. A standard approach is that taken in game theory, where each player has
su¢ cient information to compute the equilibrium. Let "player" 1 (the public) determine ~ Yt and
"player" 2 (the policy authority) determine ~ Zt: Using (3), the full equilibrium, Xt; is given by
the reduced form structural VAR:





























In this framework, it su¢ ces for each player to know B1; B2; and ￿t ￿ (￿0
1t;￿0
2t)0:
We now have su¢ cient foundation to embark on policy analysis, that is, the study of the
consequences of changes to the policymaker￿ s subsystem of the DGP. A crucial requirement for
traditional policy analysis is that the full equilibrium structural VAR for Yt is invariant to the
policy intervention. Otherwise, even without an explicit rational expectations framework, the
Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976) operates with full force, with the implication that policies ignoring
strategic behavior by the public are doomed to fail. In the EHM framework, superexogeneity
ensures this invariance. EHM (section 3) also give compelling evidence that this invariance does
hold in practice.
Our use of settable systems permits ensuring the required invariance using an approach
alternative to superexogeneity. First, observe that because the structural reduced form A￿ s
depend on all the underlying "deep parameters" B, a policy intervention B2 ! B￿
2 generally
leads to a structural shift (￿10;A11;A12) ! (￿￿
10;A￿
11;A￿
12) in the full equilibrium structural
VAR for Yt; violating invariance. The desired invariance is impossible without some further
6restriction. Here, the restriction analogous to superexogeneity is that B10 = 0: We call this
partial equilibrium recursivity, or, more simply, just recursivity. With recursivity,
~ Yt = b1 + B11Xt￿1 + B12Xt￿2 + ￿1t
~ Zt = b2 + B20Yt + B21Xt￿1 + B22Xt￿2 + ￿2t t = 1;2;::: (5)
This condition is su¢ cient for invariance to policy interventions of the reduced form structural
VAR for Yt, as B10 = 0 implies ￿10 = b1; A11 = B11 and A12 = B12: Recursivity is also necessary
for invariance to policy interventions of the reduced form VAR for Yt, in the sense formally given
by the next result.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose B10 and B20 are such that ￿ exists and that equations (4) hold.
Then B10 = 0 if and only if for all [b1;B11;B12]; we have [￿10;A11;A12] = [b1;B11;B12]:
Recursivity is informationally plausible, as it allows the public to be ignorant of the poli-
cymaker￿ s response function and shock. Instead, the public only has to know its own optimal
response coe¢ cients, B1: Although ￿1t may include components known only to the public, it
may also contain an "implementation error" or "tremble" that the public has no control over or
immediate knowledge of.
Recursivity is also behaviorally plausible. Indeed, experimental evidence in economics does
not support the hypothesis that interacting agents arrive at fully rational Nash equilibria. In-
stead, the evidence supports a "level￿k" hierarchy of agents, who adopt strategies of varying
sophistication (Stahl and Wilson, 1994; see also Crawford and Iriberri, 2007). Recursivity is
consistent with viewing the public as a level k player and the policy authority as a level k + 1
player. This ordering is supported by the fact that the public is not a single monolithic rational
agent, but an aggregate of agents of varying objectives and sophistication. On the other hand,
the policymaker is typically a well-de￿ned government entity with more or less coherent objec-
tives and with resources su¢ cient to know or learn player 1￿ s coe¢ cients B1; which it may use
to determine its coe¢ cients B2:
Thus, there are both informational and behavioral factors supporting recursivity. In what
follows, then, we take partial equilibrium recursivity to be a maintained assumption, analogous
to superexogeneity in the EHM framework.
3 Conditional Exogeneity and Granger Causality
Our discussion so far speci￿es structural causality as a property of the DGP. Particular causal
properties of the DGP ensure necessary invariance and policy e⁄ectiveness conditions for policy
7analysis. So far, models, as distinct from the DGP, have played no role. We view this as an
advantage, as delaying the introduction of models until absolutely necessary not only accords
with Occam￿ s principle, but also yields a theory with broader potential applicability. We now
discuss two further concepts, conditional exogeneity and Granger causality, that bear directly
on policy analysis and that are also properties solely of the DGP.
3.1 Conditional Exogeneity
In the settable systems approach, exogeneity plays a crucial role in identifying causal e⁄ects.
Here, identi￿cation means the notion of "correspondence to the desired entity" as discussed by
Hendry (1995) and Hendry, Lu, and Mizon (2009), based on notions of Wright (1915). The
particular correspondence relevant here is that between aspects (e.g., functions of moments)
of the joint distribution of observable variables, e.g., f(Yt;Zt)g; and the structural information
embodied in ￿0; A1, and A2:
WL give results implying that structural coe¢ cients (￿0;A1;A2) can be identi￿ed when data
are generated as in (1), provided that (Xt￿1;Xt￿2) is independent of "t given covariates4 Wt,
or, in Dawid￿ s (1979) notation,
(Xt￿1;Xt￿2) ? "t j Wt: (6)
This is a time-series analog of the selection on observables condition (Barnow, Cain, and Gold-
berger, 1980).
When (6) holds, we say that (Xt￿1;Xt￿2) is conditionally exogenous with respect to "t given
Wt; or just conditionally exogenous. This is a conditional form of the strict exogeneity relation,
(Xt￿1;Xt￿2) ? "t: (7)
In this case, Wt has zero dimension. For example, (7) holds for the structure in (1) when f"tg is
independent and identically distributed (IID), as in EHM, and f"tg is independent of (X0;X￿1);
a standard assumption in this context.
When strict exogeneity fails, conditional exogeneity can nevertheless hold, as WL discuss
in detail; see also White (2006a). Suitable choices for Wt are proxies for "t; including not only
current and lagged values of variables that may also be driven by "t but also their leads (see
White and Kennedy, 2009). Wt should not be driven by lagged Xt￿ s.
Observe that conditional exogeneity is distinct from weak, strong, or superexogeneity (Engle,
Hendry, and Richard, 1983), as these concepts are de￿ned strictly with respect to a model. In
contrast, conditional exogeneity is a property solely of the DGP.
4Covariates are sometimes called "control variables," as they "control for" the in￿ uence of otherwise omitted
variables. Here, we avoid confusion by reserving the designation "control variables" for those variables Zt that
control the target variables Yt:
8To see how conditional exogeneity ensures identi￿cation of structural coe¢ cients, we write
E(Xt j Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt) = E(￿0 + A1Xt￿1 + A2Xt￿2 + "t j Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt)
= ￿0 + A1Xt￿1 + A2Xt￿2 + E("t j Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt)
= ￿0 + A1Xt￿1 + A2Xt￿2 + E("t j Wt)
= ￿0 + A1Xt￿1 + A2Xt￿2 + C0Wt: (8)
The third equality uses (6), as this implies E("t j Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt) = E("t j Wt): The ￿nal
equality invokes a simplifying linearity assumption, E("t j Wt) = c0 + C0Wt; with c0 = 0:
Linearity is by no means essential, but it keeps our notation and discussion simple. When c0
di⁄ers from zero, then the structural intercept (i.e., the non-trend component of ￿0) becomes
unidenti￿ed; this need not be a serious di¢ culty, however.
Thus, regressing Xt on Xt￿1; Xt￿2; and Wt will yield consistent estimates of ￿0; A1; A2;
and C0; under suitable conditions. These conditions can even permit structural shifts. As the
details are somewhat involved, we leave this aside for now. The regression model implicitly
referenced here must be correctly speci￿ed for the sequence of conditional expectations fE(Xt j
Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt)g; in keeping with the discussion of White (1994, pp.141-147, especially p.144).
Note that models have just appeared for the ￿rst time and that weak exogeneity plays no role.
The only model condition we explicitly require is correct speci￿cation for the conditional mean
sequence fE(Xt j Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt)g: This condition does not apply directly to the structural
system (1). Nevertheless, knowledge of important features of the DGP (1) plays a key role in
achieving correct speci￿cation. This knowledge includes (i) which variables are economically
meaningful choices for Yt and Zt; and (ii) which variables Wt, driven by unobservable drivers of
Yt and Zt, may plausibly su¢ ce for (6), conditional exogeneity. Speci￿cation issues of functional
form, numbers of lags, cointegration (discussed later), and even structural shift locations, among
others, may be resolved from the data.
It is especially noteworthy that some, but not all, of the regression coe¢ cients in (8) have
structural meaning. Speci￿cally, ￿0; A1; and A2 are structural coe¢ cients directly relevant for
policy analysis, whereas C0 has no structural meaning. Instead, C0 yields optimal predictions.
Policy analysis may be conducted without full knowledge of ￿0; A1; and A2. For example,
interest may attach just to A112 and A122 in
Yt = ￿10 + A111Yt￿1 + A112Zt￿1 + A121Yt￿2 + A122Zt￿2 + "1t; t = 1;2;:::,
as A112 and A122 determine whether policy is e⁄ective or not. A milder exogeneity condition
identifying just A112 and A122 is
(Zt￿1;Zt￿2) ? "1t j (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt): (9)
9Now we only require a correctly speci￿ed model for the sequence fE(Yt j Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt)g; again,
weak exogeneity is not required.
3.2 Granger Causality
WL give results implying that given (1) and conditional exogeneity, Granger causality is equiv-
alent to structural causality. WL also give results implying that given (1) and in the absence of
structural causality, Granger causality is equivalent to the failure of conditional exogeneity. We
now make these claims precise and discuss their implications for policy analysis.
The relevant equivalence of structural and Granger causality is as follows:
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that f(Wt;Xt;"t)g is a stochastic process satisfying (1) and (9),
and that (Zt￿1;Zt￿2) is not solely a function of (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt): Then (Zt￿1;Zt￿2) does not
structurally cause Yt (i.e., A112 = 0 and A122 = 0) if and only if
Yt ? (Zt￿1;Zt￿2) j (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt);
that is, (Zt￿1;Zt￿2) does not ￿nite-order G￿cause Yt with respect to (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt):
The ￿nite-order Granger non-causality condition Yt ? (Zt￿1;Zt￿2) j (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt) is not
classical G non-causality. In the notation here, the classical condition is
Yt ? Zt￿1 j Y t￿1;Wt￿1;
where Zt￿1 ￿ (Zt￿1;Zt￿2;:::) is the "t ￿ 1 history" of fZtg and Wt contains no leads. As WL
explain in detail, ￿nite-order G non-causality is the extension of the classical condition most
directly relevant for "Markov" structures such as (1), in the sense that this is the condition
equivalent to structural non-causality, given conditional exogeneity. The classical condition
corresponds to more general structures under di⁄erent but related exogeneity conditions. As
WL also explain, the covariates Wt can contain both lags and leads relative to time t; without
violating the causal direction of time. Thus, the presence of Wt in the ￿nite-order de￿nition
does not con￿ ict with the spirit (or causal content) of the classical de￿nition.
Without further conditions, neither G￿causality property is necessary nor su¢ cient for the
other. As WL note, the ￿nite-order condition is that usually tested in the literature.
Thus, in the presence of the conditional exogeneity required to identify speci￿c causal ef-
fects, statements about G￿causality (speci￿cally, the applicable ￿nite-order G￿causality) are
essentially statements about structural causality. Given conditional exogeneity, it may therefore
be possible to determine whether the policy and target variables have genuine causal links (as
10required by Granger and Deutsch, 1992; see also EHM, p.375), by testing whether (Zt￿1;Zt￿2)
(or some other suitable ￿nite history) ￿nite-order G￿causes Yt (with respect to (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt)).
We qualify this statement by saying that this determination "may" be possible to signal that
certain control scenarios can interfere with use of G￿causality for this purpose (see Sargent,
1976; Buiter, 1984; Granger, 1988; and Ermini, 1992), namely that (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt) completely
determines (Zt￿1;Zt￿2). We provide further discussion in Section 7, where we discuss estimating
and testing controlled systems. For the time being, we treat such cases as special.
Similarly, one can test whether the policy variables (Yt￿1;Yt￿2) (or some other suitable ￿nite
history) structurally cause Zt (i.e., A211 6= 0 or A221 6= 0) by testing whether (Yt￿1;Yt￿2) ￿nite-
order G￿causes Zt (with respect to (Zt￿1;Zt￿2;Wt)). As EHM (p.375) comment, "actual policy
simulations may or may not assume such feedback," although past values of target variables
typically do in￿ uence policy-making behavior. Nevertheless, as we see in Section 6, feedback is
not necessary for policy e⁄ectiveness.
By itself, however, Granger causality is not enough to ensure the presence of the genuine
causal links required for policy e⁄ectiveness. The reason is that when structural causality is ab-
sent, Granger causality can still appear, as a consequence of the failure of conditional exogeneity.
In fact, the two properties are equivalent in this case:
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that f(Wt;Xt;"t)g is a stochastic process satisfying (1) and that
(Zt￿1;Zt￿2) is not solely a function of (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt):
(i) Suppose (Zt￿1;Zt￿2) does not structurally cause Yt (i.e., A112 = 0 and A122 = 0). Then
(Zt￿1;Zt￿2) does not ￿nite-order G￿cause Yt with respect to (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt) if and only if
(Zt￿1;Zt￿2) ? "1t j (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt):
(ii) Suppose (Xt￿1;Xt￿2) does not structurally cause Yt (i.e., A11 = 0 and A12 = 0). Then
(Xt￿1;Xt￿2) does not ￿nite-order G￿cause Yt with respect to Wt if and only if
(Xt￿1;Xt￿2) ? "1t j Wt:
Thus, when EHM (p.375) state, "Without Granger causality from instruments to targets, policy
is unlikely to be e⁄ective," one must recognize that, in the present context, the accuracy of this
statement rests on the strict exogeneity (Xt￿1;Xt￿2) ? "1t ensured by their speci￿cation of the
DGP (that f"tg is IID in (1); see EHM, p.373). Otherwise, the presence of Granger causality
has nothing necessarily to say about policy e⁄ectiveness, because it has nothing necessarily to
say about the structural causality required for policy e⁄ectiveness. Instead, G￿causality may
simply be signalling exogeneity failure.
114 System Estimation With and Without Cointegration
Consider a generic structural VAR (i.e., we permit but do not require Xt = (Y 0
t;Z0
t)0):
Xt = ￿0 + A1Xt￿1 + A2Xt￿2 + "t; t = 1;2;:::;
and suppose that ￿Xt is I(0) and that there exist r < N cointegrating relations such that
￿0Xt is also I(0); where ￿ is an N ￿ r matrix with full column rank. We emphasize that here
the cointegrating relations are dynamic properties of the data generating process. They are
explicitly not causal, as also emphasized by EHM, p.378. When ￿0Xt is I(0); there also exists
an N ￿ r matrix ￿ with full column rank such that
￿￿0 = A1 + A2 ￿ I:
See, e.g., Johansen (1988). Letting ￿ ￿ ￿A2 then gives the standard error-correction cointe-
grating representation
￿Xt = ￿0 + ￿￿t￿1 + ￿￿Xt￿1 + "t; (10)
where ￿Xt ￿ Xt ￿ Xt￿1 and ￿t￿1 ￿ ￿0Xt￿1: This also has a structural interpretation, repre-
senting the causal relation holding between the response ￿Xt and any admissible settings of
RHS variables ￿t￿1; ￿Xt￿1; and "t: Thus, the matrices ￿ and ￿ embody the e⁄ects on ￿Xt of
interventions to ￿t￿1 (long-run equilibrium departures) and ￿Xt￿1; respectively. On the other
hand, ￿ does not embody causal e⁄ects between elements of Xt:
When cointegration is present, the relevant exogeneity conditions permit estimation along
standard lines. Speci￿cally, suppose (6) holds. It follows from Dawid (1979, lemma 4.2(i)) that
(Xt￿1;￿Xt￿1) ? "t j Wt and (￿t￿1;￿Xt￿1) ? "t j Wt:
Thus, for example, we have
E(￿Xt j ￿t￿1;￿Xt￿1;Wt) = ￿0 + ￿￿t￿1 + ￿￿Xt￿1 + E("t j ￿t￿1;￿Xt￿1;Wt)
= ￿0 + ￿￿t￿1 + ￿￿Xt￿1 + E("t j Wt)
= ￿0 + ￿￿t￿1 + ￿￿Xt￿1 + C0Wt:
As for the Engle-Granger estimator (Engle and Granger, 1987), one can apply a two-stage
procedure, estimating ￿ in a ￿rst stage by least squares (Stock, 1987), forming an estimate ^ ￿t￿1
of ￿t￿1; and then regressing ￿Xt on an intercept and ^ ￿t￿1; ￿Xt￿1; Wt to obtain standard
estimators of ￿0; ￿; ￿; and C0: An interesting feature of this regression is that conditional
exogeneity justi￿es the inclusion of covariates Wt; as above, which may include both lags and
12leads with respect to time t: To the best of our knowledge, this possibility has not previously
been noted. As above, C0 has no structural meaning, whereas the remaining coe¢ cients have
the desired structural interpretation.
Similarly, one can apply methods of Johansen (1988, 1995), but also including covariates Wt
as regressors along with Xt￿1 and ￿Xt￿1.
When cointegration does not hold, quasi-maximum likelihood methods nevertheless apply to
deliver useful estimators of coe¢ cients of interest. We saw above that
E(Xt j Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt) = ￿0 + A1Xt￿1 + A2Xt￿2 + C0Wt:
Further, observe that with ￿t ￿ Xt ￿ E(Xt j Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt) = "t ￿ E("t j Wt); the exogeneity
condition (Xt￿1;Xt￿2) ? "t j Wt implies (Xt￿1;Xt￿2) ? ￿t j Wt; so that
E(￿t￿0
t j Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt) = E(￿t￿0
t j Wt):
It is plausible that this conditional heteroskedasticity can be exploited to yield a relatively
e¢ cient GLS-like estimator, based on a suitable speci￿cation for E(￿t￿0
t j Wt): Observe that
conditional exogeneity simpli￿es the modeling, as Xt￿1 and Xt￿2 do not contribute to the
conditional variance. On the other hand, since Wt is explicitly chosen to predict "t; we should
generally expect it to predict ￿t￿0
t as well, a⁄ording the opportunity for possible e¢ ciency gains.
For completeness, we record the normal quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) as the







￿:5(Xt ￿ ￿(Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt;￿1))0[￿(Wt;￿2)]￿1(Xt ￿ ￿(Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt;￿1));
where ￿ ￿ (￿0
1;￿0
2); ￿(Wt;￿2) is a parametrization for E(￿t￿0
t j Wt); and ￿(Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt;￿1) is
a parametrization (e.g., linear) of E(Xt j Xt￿1;Xt￿2;Wt):
Although this is the usual normal QMLE, its asymptotic properties will vary, depending on
those of fXtg; which may contain trends, unit roots, and possible unsuspected cointegration.
Generally, the QMLE will be consistent, but its asymptotic distribution need not be normal.
Asymptotic theory su¢ ciently general to handle this QMLE for the strictly exogenous case (Wt
absent) can be found in Park and Phillips (1988, 1989), Ahn and Reinsel (1990), Li, Ling, and
Wong (2001), and Sin (2004). Developing theory for the fully general conditionally exogenous
case in the absence of cointegration is an interesting topic for future research.
135 A Comparison with EHM
The settable systems-based policy analysis framework laid out above contains a variety of ele-
ments in common with the framework set forth by EHM. Nevertheless, the relation and roles
of these elements di⁄er between the two approaches. There are also elements in each that are
not shared by the other. In this section, we brie￿ y summarize the similarities and di⁄erences of
these systems and comment on their relative merits.
The goal of both our approach and EHM￿ s is to specify conditions under which one can
analyze the e⁄ects of policy interventions through the use of an econometric model. Both
approaches start by specifying the DGP. For clarity and concreteness, both we and EHM work
with a linear N￿variate structural VAR with two lags, eq.(1). For expositional convenience,
EHM restrict fXtg to be (at most) I(1): We emphasize that this is just for convenience; in the
next section we see how an I(2) process for Zt can arise naturally.
As EHM note, a necessary condition for policy analysis is that the policy instruments and
targets have genuine causal links (EHM, p.375, condition 1). In our framework, this requirement
is literally enforced by a structural causality condition: the causal e⁄ects B112 and B122 of
policy instruments Zt￿1 and Zt￿2 on the partial equilibrium response ~ Yt must not both be zero.
Otherwise, the policy instruments have no causal e⁄ect on the target variable. In contrast, EHM
(p.375) link this requirement to Granger causality: "Without Granger causality from instruments
to targets, policy is unlikely to be e⁄ective." The quali￿cation "unlikely" properly re￿ ects the
lack of perfect correspondence between structural causality and Granger causality. The two
are not the same, and the present framework draws the needed distinction, based on work of
WL, who show that G￿causality and structural causality are equivalent, provided a suitable
conditional form of exogeneity holds. In this sense, G￿causality is a derivative requirement that
may be useful for testing the structural causality of policy instruments, which is the fundamental
requirement here.
Another necessary condition is that the policy intervention "does not alter the economet-
ric model in a self-contradictory way," ensuring that the Lucas (1976) critique does not hold
(EHM, p.375, condition 3). EHM enforce this requirement by imposing superexogeneity to
ensure the necessary invariance (Engle, Hendry, and Richard, 1983, de￿nition 2.9). Superexo-
geneity combines the properties of weak exogeneity and invariance to a speci￿ed set of parameter
interventions. Thus, superexogeneity is unde￿ned without weak exogeneity. Weak exogeneity,
however, is a property of a correctly speci￿ed model relative to a DGP that acts primarily to
ensure estimator e¢ ciency (see White, 1994, pp. 141-147). A signi￿cant concern is that im-
posing weak exogeneity can rule out important structures directly relevant for policy analysis.
14For example, Fisher (1993) shows that weak exogeneity is violated when dynamic stability is
imposed in cointegrated structural VAR models.
As a simpli￿ed version of Fisher￿ s (1993) example, let both Yt and Zt be scalars, and consider
























Central to the EHM approach is the reparametrization of (11) in terms of conditional (￿Yt j ￿Zt)
and marginal (￿Zt) distributions. Here this yields
￿Yt = ￿0 + ￿1￿Zt + ￿2￿Yt￿1 + ￿3￿Zt￿1 + ￿t (12)
￿Zt = ￿02 + ￿21￿Yt￿1 + ￿22￿Zt￿1 + "2t; (13)
with
￿t ￿ "1t ￿ ￿1"2t ￿ N (0;￿);
where ￿ = ￿11 ￿ ￿12￿￿1
22 ￿21 and
￿1 = ￿12￿￿1
22 ￿0 = ￿01 ￿ ￿1￿02
￿2 = ￿11 ￿ ￿1￿21 ￿3 = ￿21 ￿ ￿1￿22:
(14)
Without dynamic stability restrictions, the parameters of the conditional and marginal distrib-
utions, ￿1 = (￿0;￿1;￿2;￿3;￿) and ￿2 = (￿02;￿21;￿22;￿22), de￿ne a sequential cut between the
conditional model (12) and the marginal model (13). The cross restrictions stemming from (14)
impose no speci￿c restrictions on the elements of either ￿1 or ￿2. Hence, weak exogeneity holds.
However, if short-run dynamic stability is imposed in (12), then we require j￿2j < 1. This,
together with (14), implies j￿11 ￿ ￿1￿21j < 1. Now ￿1 and ￿2 are no longer variation free, and
weak exogeneity of Yt￿1 no longer holds. EHM policy analysis is not possible in this system.
In contrast, our approach enforces the needed invariance by imposing the partial equilibrium
recursivity restriction B10 = 0; i.e., Zt does not structurally cause ~ Yt in partial equilibrium.
This ensures that the coe¢ cients of the full equilibrium reduced form data generating process
for Yt are invariant to policy interventions. This is not a property of the model, so we are not
imposing invariance on the econometric model, as in condition 3 of EHM. But our requirement
does imply that an invariant model for Yt can be correctly speci￿ed, since recursivity ensures
that invariance holds for the DGP. We view the transparency and plausibility of the partial
equilibrium recursivity condition B10 = 0 as a further advantage.
As we do not require weak exogeneity, our approach applies to the structurally stable VAR
above or to Fisher￿ s (1993) more elaborate example with cointegration. Although e¢ ciency
15may not be achieved without weak exogeneity, in our view this sacri￿ce is worth the gain of
permitting the analysis of important policy-relevant DGPs. Even without full e¢ ciency, relative
e¢ ciency gains are often possible. And if weak exogeneity does hold, then nothing is lost.
Although we do not require estimator e¢ ciency, adept policy analysis minimally requires
consistent coe¢ cient estimation. This is required for policymakers seeking to implement e⁄ective
policy, as these policies typically depend on the coe¢ cients of the structural VAR for the target.
This is also required for econometricians seeking to understand how the components of the
controlled system behave, both individually and jointly. To ensure consistent estimation, the
coe¢ cients of interest must be identi￿ed in the sense previously described. Otherwise, no model
can inform us about these. Given identi￿cation, we then require a correctly speci￿ed model for
certain aspects of the distribution of observables (e.g., speci￿c conditional expectations). To
ensure identi￿cation of the various e⁄ects of interest in our framework, we rely on conditional
exogeneity requirements. Thus, whereas EHM rely on weak exogeneity in a correctly speci￿ed
model to arrive at e¢ cient estimates of weakly exogenous parameters, we rely on conditional
exogeneity to identify structural e⁄ects (coe¢ cients) of interest and a correctly speci￿ed model
to consistently estimate these. In this way, our approach satis￿es EHM￿ s condition 2 for a policy
analytic framework to be of value, namely that "the model represents the economy closely enough
that its policy predictions reasonably match outcomes."
EHM additionally require that "the policy experiment is feasible" (condition 4) and that
"the policy instruments are manipulable" (condition 5). These conditions are also in force here,
but with the di⁄erence that because policy interventions (experiments) here are structural shifts
to the policy subsystem of the DGP, the model is not directly involved, as it is for EHM.
(Note that with settable systems, a su¢ ciently ￿ exible DGP can readily accommodate policy
interventions; one need not posit a separate DGP for each policy intervention.) Feasibility here
means that the contemplated intervention to the policy subsystem is itself compatible with
the DGP. Manipulability means that the policy instruments can in fact be set by the policy
authority to the value speci￿ed by the policy rule. In the discussion of Section 6, where we
study implications of various policy rules, we take feasibility and manipulability for granted
throughout.
Thus, EHM work with the DGP-based properties of Granger causality and cointegration,
together with the model properties of weak exogeneity and superexogeneity to pursue policy
analysis. Here, we pursue policy analysis using the DGP-based properties of structural causality,
conditional exogeneity, and cointegration, together with the model property of correct speci￿-
cation. There are two causal requirements: (i) causality of lagged policy instruments for the
partial equilibrium target response and (ii) recursivity, i.e., non-causality of current policy in-
16struments for the partial equilibrium target response. Invariance is a consequence of recursivity;
Granger causality is an implication of structural causality and conditional exogeneity.
6 Some Structural Implications of Policy Control Rules
So far, we have taken as given the dynamics of the control subsystem determining Zt; that is,
the policymaker￿ s behavior. But policymakers may follow speci￿c rules to attain their policy
objectives; these rules generally have implications for the integration and cointegration properties
of the system and its components. We now demonstrate the utility of the present framework
by examining the consequences of various policymaker behaviors, all directed toward achieving
the goal of a desired long-run expected value for the target variable. Despite its simplicity, this
case usefully illustrates a variety of interesting features of the controlled system. The analysis
is facilitated by not having to account for a priori considerations of weak exogeneity.
We begin by recalling the recursive partial equilibrium structural system speci￿ed earlier,
~ Yt = b1 + B11Xt￿1 + B12Xt￿2 + ￿1t;
~ Zt = b2 + B20Yt + B21Xt￿1 + B22Xt￿2 + ￿2t t = 1;2;:::
Next, we translate this system to a form called the canonical recursive representation. For this,
we equate settings with responses, i.e., Yt = ~ Yt and Zt = ~ Zt; so that
Yt = b1 + B11Xt￿1 + B12Xt￿2 + ￿1t;
Zt = b2 + B20Yt + B21Xt￿1 + B22Xt￿2 + ￿2t t = 1;2;::: (15)
We explicitly rule out instantaneous causation by requiring that ￿1t is realized prior to Yt; and
that Yt and ￿2t are realized prior to Zt: These realizations can be viewed as occurring within
the period, that is, after t ￿ 1 and before t: We emphasize this requirement by referring to this
as contemporaneous rather than instantaneous causation. These equations now represent the
natural system evolution in a form making it particularly suitable for describing policymaker
behavior and for studying the implications of this behavior.
We ￿rst consider a system of the particular form
￿Yt = b1 + ￿1￿0
1Yt￿1 + B11￿Yt￿1 + B12￿Zt￿1 + ￿1t;
￿Zt = b2 + B20￿Yt t = 1;2;::: (16)
For simplicity, we assume here that the shocks f￿1tg are IID with mean zero. Also just for
simplicity, we take ￿2t = 0; so the policymaker is able to precisely implement their policy. Thus,
￿1t is independent of (Xt￿1;Xt￿2) and estimation is standard (e.g., Ahn and Reinsel, 1990).
17Where convenient, we take N1 ￿ N2; this helps ensure that there are enough policy variables to
control all the targets. In the appendix we explicitly treat the case where N2 < N1:
With no control (￿Zt = 0), we observe the "open-loop" target dynamics,
￿Yt = b1 + ￿1￿0
1Yt￿1 + B11￿Yt￿1 + ￿1t:
When ￿1 = 0; we have an integrated open-loop system for Yt without cointegration. Otherwise,
with 0 < r ￿ rk(￿1) < N1; the open-loop target system exhibits cointegration.
We suppose the policymaker seeks to attain E(￿Yt) = ￿o in the long run, as, for example,
when the policymaker targets an in￿ ation rate or a GDP growth rate. The question of how to
adjust ￿Zt to achieve a desired long-run policy goal or even a series of desired target values
f￿Y ￿
t g in dynamic systems is the subject of the theory of optimal control. There is a vast
literature in this area; the classical theory developed in engineering and related ￿elds, was
adopted early into economics (Simon, 1952), and has transformed in ways relevant to speci￿c
challenges in economics. See Ermini (1992) and Pagan (1997) for a discussion of this evolution.
Despite its potential importance for policy analysis, the study of control of cointegrated
systems has only received modest attention so far. Besides Ermini (1992) and EHM, works
considering various aspects of this topic are those of Granger (1988), Karunaratne (1996), Jo-
hansen and Juselius (2001) (JJ), and Monti (2003). JJ and Monti (2003) in particular give
sophisticated treatments of control in cointegrated systems. For conciseness, we do not reiterate
the foundations of this theory. Instead, we just note that under suitable conditions, one feasible
optimal policy for targeting ￿o has the form above,
￿Zt = b2 + B20￿Yt;
where b2 and B20 are properly chosen. The famous Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) is of this form.
In the engineering literature, this is known as proportional (P) control of ￿Yt: More sophis-
ticated control methods are also common, especially the class of proportional-integral-derivative
(PID) methods, which can also be expressed as a constrained version of eq.(15). We ￿rst consider
P control, as this keeps the analysis relatively simple and delivers useful insights; later in this
section, we consider a form of proportional-integral (PI) control. In discussing our empirical
example, we discuss a form of PID control. Throughout, our analysis is fairly elementary. We
refer the interested reader to JJ or Monti (2003) for deeper analysis.
The P-controlled "closed-loop" target system, obtained by substitution in (16), is
￿Yt = (b1 + B12b2) + ￿1￿0
1Yt￿1 + (B11 + B12B20)￿Yt￿1 + ￿1t:
As long as ￿Zt￿1 structurally causes ￿Yt (B12 6= 0), the dynamics of the open-loop and closed-
loop systems can be very di⁄erent. Because of partial equilibrium recursivity, the open-loop
18deep parameters (b1;B11;B12) and dynamics are invariant to policy interventions. On the other
hand, the closed-loop coe¢ cients and dynamics are not invariant to policy interventions, as the
policymaker￿ s coe¢ cients (b2;B20) determine the closed-loop dynamics.
In what follows, we pay particular attention to comparing target system properties with and
without control, that is, to comparing the closed- and open-loop dynamics. We develop our
analysis by starting with simple cases and considering progressively more complex possibilities.
6.1 P Control without Open-Loop Cointegration
With P control and in the absence of cointegration, the closed-loop target system is
￿Yt = (b1 + B12b2) + (B11 + B12B20)￿Yt￿1 + ￿1t: (17)
Closed-loop target system stability is determined by the roots of the characteristic equation
det[I z ￿ (B11 + B12B20)] = 0;
where z is a complex number. The closed-loop target system is stable if these roots lie inside
the unit circle. To attain E(￿Yt) = ￿o; we require that ￿Yt is I(0); so we assume that the
policymaker chooses B20 such that the roots of the characteristic equation lie inside the unit
circle. Interestingly, the open-loop target system can have roots on or outside the unit circle;
proper choice of B20 can therefore change the order of integration between open- and closed-loop
systems. On the other hand,
Proposition 6.1 With P control, when the open-loop target system is integrated but not coin-
tegrated, no choice of (b2;B20) can initiate cointegration in the closed-loop target system.
For brevity in this section, we leave implicit the other conditions imposed above.
Further, with P control, ￿Zt is an a¢ ne function of an I(0) process, so ￿Zt is I(0) and Zt
is generally I(1): When Zt is I(1); we can ask whether Zt can be cointegrated. For this, we seek
non-zero ￿ such that ￿0Zt is I(0): We have
￿0Zt = ￿0Zt￿1 + ￿0b2 + ￿0B20￿Yt:
This is I(0) if and only if ￿0b2 + ￿0B20￿Yt = 0; in which case ￿0Zt is constant. Thus,
Proposition 6.2 With P control, when the open-loop target system is integrated but not cointe-
grated, the control system exhibits cointegration if and only if there exists non-zero ￿ in the null
space of B0
20 such that ￿0b2 = 0.
19We thus view cointegration within the P control system as possible but unusual. To support
this, we now examine the choice of (b2;B20) in more detail. As noted above, we choose (b2;B20)
to achieve the policy objective, E(Yt) = ￿o: To ￿nd a solution to this policy problem, we assume
dynamic equilibrium at ￿o and take expectations on both sides of (17) to obtain
￿o = (b1 + B12b2) + (B11 + B12B20)￿o:
Collecting terms and solving for b2 gives
b2 = B￿1
12 f(I ￿ [B11 + B12B20])￿o ￿ b1g; (18)
where B￿1
12 denotes the right inverse, B￿1
12 ￿ B0
12(B12B0
12)￿1; provided B12 has full row rank
("full structural causality" of ￿Zt￿1). If B12 has less than full rank, then either ￿o cannot be
attained or there are multiple solutions. Here, we take B12 to be of full rank, ensuring a unique
solution. The appendix treats the case where B￿1
12 need not exist.
From (18), we see that with this long-run objective the policymaker has a fair degree of
latitude, as both b2 and B20 are subject to policymaker choice. Eq.(18) gives the required value
for b2 given any choice for B20; even a choice with de￿cient rank or with B20 = 0; the no
feedback rule. In the latter case, however, we require b2 6= 0 for control to be present, in which
case cointegration in the control system cannot hold.
We also note that the closer the roots of the characteristic equation are to the unit circle,
the slower is convergence to dynamic equilibrium; the closer to zero, the quicker. As can be seen
from eq.(17), the policy goal can be attained as quickly as possible by choosing, if feasible, B20
to fully o⁄set the open-loop dynamics, such that
B20 = ￿B12
￿1 B11:
Another consequence of (18) is that when ￿o is ￿xed, a structural shift in the open-loop target
process generally results in a policy intervention (b2;B20) ! (b￿
2;B￿
20): Although the closed-loop
process may then undergo a further structural shift, the long-run behavior remains unchanged
as long as the policy goal ￿o remains constant. We can thus distinguish several distinct kinds
of policy interventions: changes to the policy goal ￿o (a "policy regime change," resulting, for
example, from a change in political regime); changes to the proportional gain B20, resulting
from "tuning exercises" undertaken by the policymaker to change the speed of convergence to
equilibrium, with consequent adjustment to b2; and changes to b2 and B20 due to policymaker
responses to structural shifts in the open-loop target system.
So far, we have seen that with P control and in the absence of open-loop target system
cointegration, there can be no cointegration within the closed-loop target system and that coin-
tegration within the control system is possible but very special. As Yt and Zt are generally both
20I(1); it also makes sense to ask whether there is or can be cointegration between the closed-loop
target and control systems.
For this, we seek ￿ = (￿0
1;￿0
2)0 such that ￿0
1Yt + ￿0












As ￿Yt is I(0); it is easily veri￿ed that cointegration holds (with ￿0
1Yt + ￿0
2Zt = const) if and
only if ￿0
2b2 = 0; with ￿0
1 = ￿￿0
2B20:
Proposition 6.3 With P control, when the open-loop target system is integrated but not coin-
tegrated, there is cointegration between the control and the controlled target if and only if there
exists non-zero ￿2 such that
￿0
2B￿1
12 f(I ￿ [B11 + B12B20])￿o ￿ b1g = 0:
This places very stringent conditions on the relation between ￿o and B20:
Thus, even though there is no cointegration in the open-loop target system, P control can
induce cointegration between target and control. But this is a quite special circumstance that
need not be consistent with policymaker behavior, as the policymaker may choose a speed of
convergence to the long-run policy goal ￿o incompatible with this condition.
We also see that policy interventions may create or destroy cointegration between control
and target. Speci￿cally, interventions to ￿o but not B20 (policy regime change) or to (b2;B20)
but not ￿o (tuning exercises) will destroy cointegration if it exists and may (but are not likely
to) initiate cointegration if it does not. Interventions to (b2;B20) resulting from structural shifts
in the target subsystem may (but are not likely to) create or can easily destroy cointegration
between target and control.
6.2 P and PI Control with Open-Loop Cointegration
6.2.1 P Control
Now consider a system that implements P control of a target exhibiting cointegration in the
open-loop target dynamics:
￿Yt = b1 + ￿1￿0
1Yt￿1 + B11￿Yt￿1 + B12￿Zt￿1 + ￿1t;
￿Zt = b2 + B20￿Yt t = 1;2;::: (19)
We again suppose the policymaker seeks to attain E(￿Yt) = ￿o. Our discussion parallels that
for the pure integrated case, but now we must take proper account of the cointegrating terms.
21The closed-loop representation for the target system is now
￿Yt = (b1 + B12b2) + ￿1￿0
1Yt￿1 + (B11 + B12B20)￿Yt￿1 + ￿1t: (20)
From this, we see that
Proposition 6.4 With P control, when the open-loop target system is cointegrated, no choice
of (b2;B20) can remove cointegration from the closed-loop target system.
Analysis for the control system identical to that for the pure integrated case gives
Proposition 6.5 With P control, when the open-loop target system is cointegrated, the control
system exhibits cointegration if and only if there exists non-zero ￿ in the null space of B0
20 such
that ￿0b2 = 0.
To see how policy can achieve a long-run policy goal, take expectations on both sides of (20)
at the steady state, which gives
￿o = (b1 + B12b2) + ￿1￿1 + (B11 + B12B20)￿o; (21)
where ￿1 ￿ ￿0





so that in the steady state
￿0
1￿o = 0:
This restriction de￿nes the feasible long-run policy targets. We call these "cointegration feasi-
ble." Any policy goal not satisfying this condition is unattainable in this system. Essentially,
the cointegrating relations remove r < N1 degrees of freedom from the policymaker￿ s discretion.
This may enable the policymaker to focus on controlling a linear combination of ￿Yt using a
smaller set of policy control variables. We discuss this case in the appendix.
To solve for ￿1; multiply both sides of (21) by ￿0
1: This gives
￿0
1(b1 + B12b2) + ￿0
1￿1￿1 + ￿0
1(B11 + B12B20)￿o = 0 so that
￿1 = ￿(￿0
1￿1)￿1￿0
1[(B11 + B12B20)￿o + (b1 + B12b2)];
where we use the fact that ￿1 and ￿1 have full column rank, ensuring that ￿0
1￿1 is nonsingular.
Substituting this into (21) gives
￿o = (b1 + B12b2) ￿ ￿1(￿0
1￿1)￿1￿0
1[(B11 + B12B20)￿o + (b1 + B12b2)] + (B11 + B12B20)￿o:
22Collecting terms, we get
fI ￿ J1(B11 + B12B20)g￿o = J1(b1 + B12b2); (22)
where J1 ￿ I ￿ ￿1(￿0
1￿1)￿1￿0
1 is the "long-run impact matrix" (see JJ, eq.(4)). Observe that
J1(B11 + B12B20) plays the role of a "￿rst order autocorrelation" in this system. This deter-
mines the speed of convergence to the policy steady state, provided the roots of the associated
characteristic equation are inside the unit circle. With P control, the policymaker can in￿ uence
this speed of convergence by choice of B20:
Generally, J1 is singular, so when we express b2 in terms of B20; we obtain
J1B12b2 = [I ￿ J1(B11 + B12B20)]￿o ￿ J1b1:
Compare this to (18) above: the pure integrated case results when J1 = I: This is an under-
determined system of equations, so there are generally many ways to choose b2 satisfying these
equations for given B20 and ￿o: One way to proceed in such cases is to minimize a convex
function of b2 (for example, b0
2b2) subject to (22).
We emphasize that only choices for ￿o satisfying ￿0
1￿o = 0 give valid choices for B20 and b2.
As for the pure integrated case, we ask whether cointegration can hold between the target
and control subsystems. Now we seek ￿ = (￿0
1;￿0
2)0 such that ￿0
1Yt +￿0
2Zt is I(0): The analysis is










2B20)(Yt ￿ Yt￿1) + ￿0
2b2:
As in the previous case, we obtain cointegration if and only if ￿0
2b2 = 0; with ￿0
1 = ￿￿0
2B20: Thus,
Proposition 6.6 With P control, when the open-loop target system is cointegrated, there is
cointegration between the control and the controlled target if and only if there exists non-zero ￿2
such that 2
4



















In contrast to the pure integrated case, there may be no such solution ￿o: Thus, this possibility
is even more exceptional than the pure integrated case. Although P control can sometimes
induce cointegration between target and control, this is a very special circumstance, depending
on exact policymaker choices that may be incompatible with policymaker objectives.
236.2.2 PI Control
A potential drawback of P control is that it cannot achieve policies violating ￿0
1￿o = 0: If the
policymaker￿ s desired ￿o is not compatible with this restriction, it would be useful to alter ￿1;
say to ~ ￿1; for which ~ ￿
0
1￿o = 0 does hold. This cannot be done with P control. Accordingly,
consider a system with a cointegrated open-loop target as above, but with the control system
augmented by the inclusion of a term depending on Yt:
￿Yt = b1 + ￿1￿0
1Yt￿1 + B11￿Yt￿1 + B12￿Zt￿1 + ￿1t;
￿Zt = b2 + B20￿Yt + B￿1
12 ￿1￿0
1Yt t = 1;2;:::;
where ￿1 is N1 ￿ r: This control system has a form known as proportional-integral (PI) control
in the engineering literature. The presence of Yt implements the "integral" aspect of the control.
We denote this particular implementation PI1:
The closed-loop target behavior for this system is given by
￿Yt = b1 + ￿1￿0
1Yt￿1 + B11￿Yt￿1 + B12(b2 + B20￿Yt￿1 + B￿1
12 ￿1￿0
1Yt￿1) + ￿1t
= b1 + B12b2 + (￿1￿0
1 + ￿1￿0
1)Yt￿1 + (B11 + B12B20)￿Yt￿1 + ￿1t
= b1 + B12b2 + ￿1(￿1 + ￿1)0Yt￿1 + (B11 + B12B20)￿Yt￿1 + ￿1t:
We see that this system is cointegrated, but now with cointegration parameters (￿1; ~ ￿1); with
~ ￿1 ￿ ￿1 +￿1: PI1 control permits the policymaker to modify the cointegration-feasible policies.
By suitable choice of ￿1; the policymaker can reduce the cointegrating rank or even remove
cointegration entirely from the closed-loop target system (set ￿1 = ￿￿1). We have
Proposition 6.7 When the open-loop target system is cointegrated, PI 1 control can modify or
remove the closed-loop target system cointegrating vector, ￿1 + ￿1.
We also see that with PI1 control, since Yt is I(1); ￿Zt = b2 + B20￿Yt + B￿1
12 ￿1￿0
1Yt is
generally I(1); so Zt is I(2): There could be linear combinations of Zt that are I(1); but as the
details are involved and the circumstances special, we do not pursue this. Although the target
and control are generally of di⁄erent orders, we can see immediately from the control equations
that ￿Zt ￿B￿1
12 ￿1￿0
1Yt is I(0), so ￿Zt and Yt are cointegrated. Interestingly, this cointegration
is generated by the causal control relation between ￿Zt and Yt; rather than simply re￿ ecting
aspects of system dynamics.
With PI1, the policymaker can attain ￿o for which ~ ￿
0
1￿o = 0; choosing b2 and B20 such that
fI ￿ ~ J1(B11 + B12B20)g￿o = ~ J1(b1 + B12b2);





PI1 control is limited in the sense that it cannot initiate cointegration in the closed loop
target system if cointegration is absent in the open-loop target system. Also, PI1 control does
not allow the policymaker to alter the e⁄ect ￿1 of equilibrium departures on the target variable.
Nevertheless, a straightforward elaboration of PI1 does permit these possibilities. Speci￿cally,
consider PI2 control, where, with ￿1 an N1 ￿ r matrix,
￿Zt = b2 + B20￿Yt + B￿1
12 [￿1￿0
1 + ￿1(￿1 + ￿1)0]Yt t = 1;2;:::
A little algebra shows that the closed-loop target system has the form
￿Yt = b1 + B12b2 + ~ ￿0
1~ ￿
0
1Yt￿1 + (B11 + B12B20)￿Yt￿1 + ￿1t:
Here, the cointegration vector is ~ ￿1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿1 and the e⁄ect of equilibrium departures is
~ ￿1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿1: Not only does PI2 control permit the policymaker to modify the cointegration-
feasible policies, it permits the policymaker to adjust the response to equilibrium departures
or even introduce cointegration into the closed-loop target system, despite its absence in the
open-loop target system. We have
Proposition 6.8 When the open-loop target system is integrated or cointegrated, PI 2 control
can modify the closed-loop target system cointegrating coe¢ cients (￿1 + ￿1); (￿1 + ￿1).
As for PI1 control, Zt is generally I(2): We do not pursue an analysis of the possible coin-
tegrating properties of Zt as these can arise only under very special circumstances. Also, as for
PI1, we see immediately from the control equations that ￿Zt ￿ B￿1
12 [￿1￿0
1 + ￿1(￿1 + ￿1)0]Yt is
I(0), so ￿Zt and Yt are again causally cointegrated.
Parallel to PI1; with PI2 the policymaker can attain ￿o for which ~ ￿
0
1￿o = 0; where ~ ￿1 =
￿1 + ￿1: Again we chose b2 and B20 such that
fI ￿ ~ J1(B11 + B12B20)g￿o = ~ J1(b1 + B12b2);





Another case of PI control ￿xes ￿1 at zero, with ￿1 6= 0: We call this PI3 control. This is
the special case of PI2 where the policymaker only modi￿es the speed of error correction. Its
properties can be inferred from our discussion of PI2, so we do not discuss this further here.
7 Estimating and Testing Controlled Systems
We now consider some econometric issues that arise in estimating and testing controlled systems.
Our discussion here is mainly pragmatic, in the spirit Granger (2009) compellingly advocated.
25Thus, we will not be concerned so much with regularity conditions or asymptotic properties, but
rather with describing practical methods that can o⁄er useful insight while preventing us from
going too far astray with any particular line of investigation.
7.1 A Controlled System for Estimation and Testing
For concreteness, we consider a DGP accommodating PI control of the target ￿rst di⁄erences,
￿Yt = b1 + D1Yt￿1 + B11￿Yt￿1 + B12￿Zt￿1 + ￿1t; (24)
￿Zt = b2 + B20￿Yt + D2Yt + ￿2t t = 1;2;::: (25)
When D1 = ￿1￿0
1 and D2 = B￿1
12 [~ ￿1~ ￿
0
1 ￿ D1]; we have the system with open-loop cointegration
and PI2 control considered in the last section. This system is a special case of eq.(1) with possible
cointegration in the open-loop target subsystem, and, consistent with this form of PI control,
also possibly between Yt and ￿Zt. Observe that we now permit policy implementation to be
noisy, as an implementation error ￿2t appears in the control subsystem. This does not a⁄ect
any of the results of the previous section, as this noise just introduces a mean zero component
B12￿2;t￿1 into the closed-loop target system.
In what follows, it is often convenient to take N2 ￿ N1; but we do not always require this.
The appendix provides further discussion of the N2 < N1 case.
The associated closed-loop target system is
￿Yt = c1 + ~ ￿1~ ￿
0
1Yt￿1 + C11￿Yt￿1 + ￿1t; (26)
where c1 ￿ b1 + B12b2; ~ ￿1~ ￿
0
1 = D1 + B12D2; C11 ￿ B11 + B12B20; and ￿1t ￿ ￿1t + B12￿2;t￿1:
Observe that even if D1 has full rank, the closed-loop system can be cointegrated. That is, PI2
control can induce a cointegrated closed-loop target system, even when the open-loop system is
not cointegrated. For what follows, we assume that D1 + B12D2 has non-zero rank ~ r < N1; so
that the closed-loop system is in fact cointegrated.
An important aspect of these structures is that they are subject to structural shifts. The
target system (24) is subject to "exogenous" shifts, that is, shifts arising outside the controlled
system. The policy system (25) is subject to policy interventions associated with policy regime
changes, tuning exercises, or exogenous shifts in the target system. Endogenous shifts in the
target system (24) represent a failure of invariance, in which case the Lucas critique operates.
For now, we assume recursivity, ruling out endogenous shifts. Below, we discuss testing this.
Because the closed-loop target system contains coe¢ cients from both the target and control
structures, the coe¢ cients of (26) can shift for any of the reasons just given. It is also in principle
possible for the policy authority to undertake policy interventions that precisely o⁄set exogenous
26structural changes to (24), leaving (26) unchanged. Nevertheless, this requires a su¢ cient degree
of knowledge and ￿ exibility that exogenous structural shifts in (24) are likely in practice to be
re￿ ected in structural shifts in (26).
It is of course possible that the target subsystem experiences no exogenous shifts. This
is the simplest and most favorable case for estimation and inference, so we begin with this.
Correspondingly, we suppose for now that there are no policy regime changes or tuning exercises
in the control system. It follows that the closed-loop target system coe¢ cients also do not shift.
We ￿rst focus on whether policy can be e⁄ective; that is, we wish to know whether B12 = 0
in (24), or, when relevant, whether B12 has full row rank. For simplicity, we take f￿0
1t;￿0
2tg to
be IID, with (Y1;￿Y0;￿Z0) independent of (￿0
11;￿0
21): This ensures strict exogeneity and makes
estimation relatively straightforward.
Although we maintain the assumption of structural stability, to avoid going astray at the
outset, it is helpful to begin by estimating the closed-loop system (26) and examining its stability.
As (26) is a standard cointegrated system, one can apply standard methods, such as the Engle-
Granger (1987) estimator or the methods of Johansen (1995). One can test for stability using
the methods of Bai and Perron (1998) or Juselius (2006), or the indicator saturation methods
of Hendry, Johansen, and Santos (2008) (HJS); see also Johansen and Nielsen (2009). If one
￿nds evidence of a stable sample or subsample, one can proceed by analyzing that data, as
this evidence is consistent with stability of both the target and control systems. For now, we
suppose we have such a subsample. Estimating c1; C11; ~ ￿1; and ~ ￿1 in (26) provides complete
information about the closed-loop target dynamics under the governing policy regime in the
absence of exogenous structural change in (24) and even when policy is ine⁄ective.
Examining (24) and (25) with a view to estimating (24) and noting that (26) ensures that
Yt is I(1); we see that there are two main possibilities for ￿Zt. The ￿rst is that ￿Zt is I(0);
the second is that ￿Zt is I(1): The ￿rst possibility arises in either of two cases. It is easily
checked that ￿Zt is I(0) with open loop cointegration (D1 = ￿1￿0




1) or (ii) PI3 control (~ ￿1 = ￿1; but ~ ￿1 6= ￿1). On the other hand, regardless of
open loop cointegration, we have ￿Zt ￿ I(1) with either PI1 or PI2 control. Thus, a test of the
null hypothesis that ￿Zt is I(1) vs. the I(0) alternative is a test for PI1 or PI2 control vs. P or
PI3 control, assuming correct speci￿cation of (24) and (25).
Di⁄erent considerations arise in estimating (24), depending on whether ￿Zt is I(1) or I(0):
We take these up below. In either case, however, one must check whether ￿Zt￿1 is perfectly
collinear with Yt￿1;￿Yt￿1: The possibility of this collinearity underlies claims that Granger
causality testing (here, structural causality testing) is useless for policy analysis (Sargent, 1976;
Buiter, 1984). As Granger (1988) pointed out, however, as long as there is any noise in the policy
27rule, this objection falls. We saw in Section 6 that noiseless control is e⁄ective for achieving
policy goals; here we see that this can hinder policy analysis by making it impossible to identify
B12: Thus, noisy control is helpful for learning about B12; and, in this regard, the noisier the
better, as near multi-collinearity is almost as much a prohibitive obstacle as is perfect collinearity.
To assess potential di¢ culties in identifying B12; that is, to see how great a problem collinear-
ity may be, one should investigate the relation between ￿Zt and (Yt;￿Yt) before estimating (24).
An immediate simple diagnostic is the R2 from the regression of ￿Zt on a constant, Yt and ￿Yt;
i.e., (25). We would ideally like to ￿nd a good but not perfect ￿t. Too loose a ￿t suggests that
the policy instrument is not actually being used to manipulate the supposed target or that some
control rule other than P or PI is in use. A good ￿t suggests at least that the policymaker
believes B12 is not zero. We return to this regression below, but for now we suppose that we
are in the typical situation in which the ￿t is reasonably good but not perfect.
7.2 The ￿Zt ￿ I(0) Case
Suppose now that ￿Zt is I(0): Then we can estimate (24) by standard methods for cointegrated
systems. In fact, ￿Zt ￿ I(0) implies ~ ￿1 = ￿1; so we can estimate (24) by least-squares regression
of ￿Yt on a constant, ~ ￿t￿1 ￿ ~ ￿
0
1Yt￿1 = ￿t￿1; ￿Yt￿1; and ￿Zt￿1; where ~ ￿t￿1 is estimated using
the estimate of ~ ￿1 obtained from (26). When ￿Zt is I(0); the estimator of B12; say ^ B12; has
standard properties, so we can immediately check policy e⁄ectiveness by testing B12 = 0. One
can also use convenient methods recently given by Camba-MØndez and Kapetanios (2008) to
estimate and test the rank of B12.
If we do not impose the constraint that ~ ￿1 = ￿1 in estimating (24), we expect that the
estimates obtained from (24) and (26) will be similar. A speci￿cation test can be performed
by formally testing the hypothesis ~ ￿1 = ￿1: If we reject, this indicates that either or both (24)
or (26) are misspeci￿ed. This test can be conveniently performed by estimating a version of
(24) modi￿ed by including ~ ￿t￿1 as well as Yt￿1; using the Johansen procedure to estimate and
test the cointegrating rank. Under the null hypothesis, the cointegrating rank will be zero,
as cointegration is already captured by ~ ￿t￿1: If the Johansen procedure rejects the null of no
cointegration, one must reject ~ ￿1 = ￿1:
The estimates of ￿1 and ~ ￿1 may or may not di⁄er, depending on whether the system is
subject to P or PI3 control By testing the hypothesis ~ ￿1 = ￿1; we can test the null that P
control is in e⁄ect, against the alternative of PI3 control. An easier test of the P control null
can be accomplished using (25). With either P or PI3 control, this relation can be estimated
by regressing ￿Zt on a constant, ￿Yt; and ~ ￿t: Under P control, the coe¢ cients on ~ ￿t are
zero; under PI3 control they are not. Thus, one can test P control vs. PI3 control by applying
28standard tests for zero values of these coe¢ cients.
Usually, we expect that the estimates of b1 and c1 will di⁄er and that the estimates of B11
and C11 will di⁄er. When N1 = N2; we can use estimates of b1; B11; B12; c1; and C11 to estimate
b2 and B20; as
b2 = ￿B￿1
12 (c1 ￿ b1) B20 = ￿B￿1
12 (C11 ￿ B11):
Generally, however, it is simplest to estimate b2 and B20 using a modi￿ed version of (25),
￿Zt = b2 + B20￿Yt + D￿
2 ~ ￿t + ￿2t t = 1;2;:::;
taking advantage of the P or PI3 structure.
Even if ￿Zt and (Yt;￿Yt) are perfectly collinear, identi￿cation of B12 is not a lost cause, as
policy interventions can also identify B12: This can also improve the precision of estimation even
in the absence of perfect collinearity. For this, we require a subsample in which (24) is stable
and in which (25) exhibits one or more shifts. For simplicity, suppose there is a single policy
intervention (b2;B20) ! (b￿
2;B￿
20); and de￿ne c￿
1 = b1 + B12b￿
2 and C￿
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inference is then straightforward, although computationally somewhat involved.
The methods just discussed su¢ ce to identify and estimate all structural coe¢ cients for the
P or PI3 cases, so we now turn our attention to the case in which ￿Zt ￿ I(1):
7.3 The ￿Zt ￿ I(1) Case
The ￿Zt ￿ I(1) case arises with PI1 or PI2 control. From (25), we see that the I(1) variable Yt
appears on the RHS multiplied by D2; which, in the case of PI1 or PI2 control, does not give an
I(0) product D2Yt: Since b2 + B20￿Yt￿1 + ￿2t is I(0); ￿Zt ￿ I(1) follows.
29Inspecting the target system
￿Yt = b1 + D1Yt￿1 + B11￿Yt￿1 + B12￿Zt￿1 + ￿1t;
we see that the LHS ￿Yt is I(0) (as ensured by (26)), but that two I(1) variables appear on the
RHS, Yt￿1 and ￿Zt￿1: In the absence of other structure, this would prevent estimating D1 and
B12: But here we have that Yt￿1 and ￿Zt￿1 are cointegrated by (25) and in just the right way
to permit consistent estimation of (b1;D1;B11;B12) by least squares. Note that D1 may or may
not have full rank, but even when D1 = ￿1￿0
1, standard estimation methods for cointegrated
systems will not apply, as the relevant cointegrating vector here is ~ ￿1; not ￿1:
Two possibilities for conducting inference about B12 suggest themselves. The ￿rst is to
directly apply the results of Park and Phillips (1988, 1989). The resulting inference for B12 may
be non-standard, however. An apparently simpler possibility is to use a modi￿ed version of (26)
to estimate B12, namely
￿Yt = c1 + ~ ￿1~ ￿
0
1Yt￿1 + C11￿Yt￿1 + B12￿2;t￿1 + ￿1t; (27)
where we replace ￿2;t￿1 with an estimate from (25), say ^ ￿2t￿1: Using the estimator for B12
from this two-stage procedure, say ~ B12; should only involve standard
p
T inference, although
adjustment for the e⁄ects of the ￿rst-stage estimation may be required. Note that estimating
the policy equation (25) involves a regression of an I(1) variable (￿Zt) on an I(1) variable (Yt)
with cointegration between them, as in Stock (1987). In fact, one can identify and consistently
estimate b2 and B20 from (25) with a variety of standard procedures, plausibly with standard
p
T asymptotics.
So far, the methods described for the ￿Zt ￿ I(1) case cover identi￿cation and consistent
estimation of all system parameters except ￿1 and ￿1 when D1 = ￿1￿0
1: But the singular value
decomposition applies to represent D1 as




where U and V are N1 ￿ N1 orthogonal matrices, ￿ is an N1 ￿ N1 diagonal matrix with r =
rk(D1) non-zero eigenvalues on the diagonal, S is the N1 ￿ r selection matrix, S0 ￿ [Ir;0];
and ￿1 ￿ U￿1=2S; ￿0
1 ￿ V￿1=2S: When r < N1; this decomposition permits us to identify and
estimate the open-loop cointegrating parameters.
Because the details appear somewhat involved, we leave a formal analysis of inference for
B12 based on the results of Park and Phillips (1988, 1989) to future research.
307.4 Model Diagnostics
Regardless of whether ￿Zt is I(0) or I(1); there is a variety of model diagnostics that both
the policymaker and the econometrician should examine. For the I(0) case, these can be used
to conduct formal speci￿cation tests, as inference is standard; accordingly we omit the details.
In the discussion to follow, any references to tests apply to just the I(0) case. Nevertheless,
these diagnostics can be also be computed for the I(1) case and may be informative. They
also plausibly can form the basis for formal speci￿cation tests, but this will require proper
development of the relevant asymptotic distributions.
A particularly important diagnostic task is to examine the exogeneity of (Yt￿1;￿Yt￿1;￿Zt￿1).
If this fails, the estimator of B12 is not informative about the e⁄ect of ￿Zt￿1 on Yt: Here, ex-
ogeneity is ensured by the assumption that f￿0
1t;￿0
2tg is an independent sequence. A simple
diagnostic for this can be based on estimates of ￿1t ￿ ￿1t+B12￿2;t￿1 from (26), say ^ ￿1t: One can
form the analog of Durbin￿ s (1970) h￿test from the regression of ^ ￿1t on ^ ￿1;t￿1: The estimated
matrix ^ ￿ of ￿rst-order autocorrelations can then be used to check or test whether the true au-
tocorrelations are zero. This test will not have power against all possible alternatives, so one
should also test autocorrelation using estimates of ￿1t and ￿2t from (24) and (25).
It is important to examine whether linear models based on (24) are correctly speci￿ed, that
is, whether the DGP for ￿Yt is indeed the assumed linear structure analyzed here. If not, the
estimator of B12 is not fully informative about the e⁄ect of ￿Zt￿1 on ￿Yt; and the policy rules
discussed here may not be adequate for the desired control. There is an extensive literature on
testing for neglected nonlinearity in regression analysis, ranging from Ramsey￿ s (1969) classic
RESET procedure to modern neural network or random ￿eld tests. (See, for example, Lee,
White and Granger, 1993; Hamilton, 2001; and Dahl and Gonzalez-Rivera, 2003.) The methods
of WL for testing linearity (CI test regression 1 and 2) are quite convenient. One can also test
for encompassing (e.g., Hendry and Mizon, 1982), the information matrix equality (White, 1982)
and other indicia of misspeci￿cation, as detailed, for example, in White (1990). These methods
can be straightforwardly applied to (24), (25), or (26). In our illustrative application in Section
8, we give details of a neural network-based method for testing neglected nonlinearity.
The policymaker and the econometrician must also check whether recursivity holds. If not,
the needed invariance is absent, and traditional policy control is unworkable. For this, one can
apply methods of Engle and Hendry (1993), who describe testing invariance without imposing
weak exogeneity. See also Hendry (1988) and Hendry and Santos (2009). Hendry and Massman
(2006) survey and extend the concept of co-breaking, directly relevant here. A particularly
straightforward procedure for testing invariance, related to methods of Hendry and Mizon (1998)
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intervention (b2;B20) ! (b￿
2;B￿
20); where one is willing to maintain the assumption of target
structure stability. The idea is to estimate a version of (24) augmented by including a vector
of dummy variables, say d0t; whose ith element d0it is zero prior to policy intervention i and
is one thereafter. The dates of policy interventions can be speci￿ed a priori on theoretical
or institutional grounds or can be determined empirically from estimation of (25), using, for
example, methods of Bai and Perron (1998). This augmented structure has the form
￿Yt = b1 + D1Yt￿1 + B11￿Yt￿1 + B12￿Zt￿1 + ￿1d0t + ￿1t:
Under the null of recursivity, ￿1 = 0; evidence of departures from zero is evidence against
recursivity. When ￿Zt is I(0), one can apply standard methods to test ￿1 = 0:
A drawback of this test is that unsuspected exogenous structural shifts in the target system
could confound its results, leading to false rejections. A procedure not subject to this di¢ culty
involves constructing a sequence of dummies f(d1t;d2t)g such that d1t = 1 if there is a structural
shift in period t in the target system (24) and d1t = 0 otherwise; and d2t = 1 if there is
a structural shift in in period t in the policy system (25) and d2t = 0 otherwise. One then
regresses (d1t;d2t) on its lags and tests whether d1t is structurally caused by lags of d2t: Under
the null of recursivity, there can be no such causality; otherwise, causality will be present. The
challenge for this test is that it may require a relatively long data history with many breaks in
order to have power.
As we further discuss below, it is important to rule out neglected nonlinearity when testing
for recursivity, as neglected nonlinearity can manifest as one or more structural shifts.
7.5 Policy Implementation and Operation
Once the policy authority has determined that its policy instruments are indeed e⁄ective (re-
cursivity holds and B12 is non-zero or, better, of full rank) and has gained reliable knowledge
of b1; D1; B11; and B12; it can determine whether its desired policy goal ￿o is feasible for some
set of policy parameters b2; B20; and D2: If there are multiple feasible implementations, the
policymaker can select a preferred implementation and begin policy operations.
Once policy operations begin, a main activity for the policymaker, besides manipulating
the policy instruments, is to monitor the target system to detect exogenous shifts that will
require policy interventions to keep the system on track. This raises some important practical
issues that have not been addressed here or, to our knowledge, elsewhere in the cointegration
literature. The ￿rst of these is how the policymaker detects shifts. In our earlier discussion, we
implicitly assumed the policymaker could detect these immediately. But this is unrealistic. More
32realistically, the policymaker could apply statistical techniques for real-time structural change
monitoring in either (24) or (26). Standard monitoring methods (e.g., Chu, Stinchcombe, and
White, 1996; Hornik, Leisch, Kleiber, and Zeileis, 2005) do not necessarily allow detecting
changes in a cointegrated structure; this is an interesting topic for future research. The second
is the even more di¢ cult question of how the policymaker learns the new structure, once a shift
has been detected. In practice, this also will take some time; how much will depend on the
nature of the shift. Meanwhile, the show must go on; policy must continue.
This suggests that a realistic framework for policy analysis is one with adaptive learning by
the policy authority in a context that permits cointegration and exogenous structural breaks.
Such a framework could possibly be based on the recursive learning framework of Chen and
White (1998), although this would need modi￿cation to accommodate recursive learning of
cointegrated structures. Handling exogenous breaks could be accommodated by keeping the
learning rate constant or bounded away from zero, rather than declining to zero with the sample
size, as Chen and White (1998) require. The form of policy rules emerging from such a frame-
work could well be of the form (25), but with all the policy parameters adjusting through time,
based on convenient recursive estimation strategies. Another possibility is that the policymaker
behaves according to a recursive Bayesian procedure, such as that proposed by Pesaran, Pet-
tenuzzo, and Timmermann (2006). As analyzing such frameworks is beyond the scope of the
present analysis, we leave this for future research.
7.6 Questions for the Econometrician
Questions of interest to the econometrician but not the policymaker involve extracting informa-
tion known only to the policymaker. For example, the econometrician should be interested in
whether the system is in fact under PI or P control, or whether some other rule operates. We
saw above that given correct speci￿cation, the econometrician can draw inferences about P or
PI control from the integration properties of ￿Zt: We have also seen that the econometrician
can identify and consistently estimate (~ ￿1; ~ ￿1); (b1;B11;B12;￿1;￿1); and (b2;B20;D2):
The econometrician may also want to know ￿o: For this, (26) may provide su¢ cient infor-






















33To determine whether P or PI control correctly describes policymaker behavior, the econo-
metrician can use the modi￿ed version of (25),
￿Zt ￿ D2Yt = b2 + B20￿Yt + ￿2t t = 1;2;:::;
where, for estimation, we replace unknown LHS coe¢ cients with their (￿rst-stage) estimates.
One can then conduct speci￿cation tests on this regression. If misspeci￿cation is found, this
indicates that the policy rule is not P or PI control of ￿Yt by ￿Zt or that the policy goal
di⁄ers from long run targeting of E(￿Yt) = ￿o; or both. Conducting these speci￿cation tests
will require properly accounting for the joint distribution of the ￿rst-stage estimators of D2 and
the second-stage estimators of b2;B20: It is plausible that the asymptotic distribution for the
second-stage estimator will be a⁄ected by the distribution of the ￿rst-stage estimators of D2:
When ￿Zt is I(0); adjusting for this is straightforward; the distribution of the estimator of ~ ￿1
(= ￿1) will typically not play a role, due to its superconsistency.
Once one has estimated the system coe¢ cients, one can investigate system impulse responses
by perturbing ￿2;t￿1 in (27) and simulating. One can also investigate the e⁄ects of policy
interventions by studying the e⁄ects of changes to the elements of (b2;B20;D2):
8 Illustrative application
The e⁄ectiveness of U.S. Federal Reserve policy has been the focus of many previous theoretical
and empirical studies. See, e.g., Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (1996), Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996), and Hamilton (2008), as well as the references
given there. Here, we apply the framework described above to illustrate how one could examine
this issue. We emphasize that because our goal here is only to illustrate useful methods, we
will not push this investigation as far as would be required to arrive at a model su¢ ciently
well speci￿ed to deliver de￿nitive insights about Fed policy. Thus, we will pay attention to
indicators of model shortcomings without necessarily resolving the issues identi￿ed. As will
become apparent, resolving the issues uncovered will in fact require an extensive modeling e⁄ort
well beyond what we can feasibly undertake here.
For our illustration, we examine the impact of Fed policy on macroeconomic variables Yt
(in￿ ation, unemployment, output, and oil prices) through the Federal Funds rate, Zt: While the
Fed does not directly control this rate, it sets its target value; daily open market operations
then align the Fed Funds rate closely to the target value. This corresponds exactly to the case
of imperfect control examined above.
Speci￿cally, we let Zt be the natural logarithm of the e⁄ective Federal Funds rate (taken from
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), and we let Yt include (i) the natural
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of Governors of the Federal Reserve System); (ii) the natural logarithm of the seasonally adjusted
US total unemployment rate for all individuals aged 16 and over (taken from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics); (iii) the US in￿ ation rate, computed as the 12-month di⁄erence of the natural
logarithm of the consumer price index for all urban consumers (taken from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics); and (iv) the natural logarithm of the Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (taken
from the Energy Information Administration). The data are monthly, covering January, 1986
through December, 2007, a total of T = 262; observations adjusting for lags and di⁄erencing.
We begin by examining whether the closed loop target system (26) is stable. For this, we use
the recursive log-likelihood test described in Juselius (2006). While there are several di⁄erent
tests that could be used, we focus on the Juselius (2006) test, as it accommodates cointegration
and it permits us to examine both the short-run and long-run components of the DGP.
The test statistic is computed recursively, starting from a baseline period and extending
backward or forward in time by adding observations to the baseline. Here we apply the backward
recursion. Let T1 index the ￿rst observation in the baseline sample considered in the recursion.
We set T1 to December 2002, ensuring ￿ve years of the data in the baseline period, T1;:::;T:


























where p (= 4) is the number of equations in the system and r is the cointegrating rank, as
estimated by the Johansen (1995) procedure. Here, we ￿nd r = 1 cointegrating relation. The
estimated variance-covariance matrices for the sub-sample including observations t1;:::;T and
the full sample are b ￿t1 and b ￿T; respectively.
Under the null hypothesis of DGP stability, the 95% quantile for the test is 1.36. We display
two versions of the test in Figure 1. The ￿rst, labelled X(t), is based on the full model, whereas
the second, R1(t); is based on the long-run concentrated model, where the short-term variables
have been concentrated out. This latter version is based on the model obtained after the ￿rst
stage of the Johansen (1995) procedure.
As the graph shows, we do not reject stability for the closed-loop system using the R1 form
of the test. The statistic for the X version crosses the critical value in April, 1996, but by a
small amount. In line with our illustrative intent, we take these results as largely consistent
with stability for the closed-loop system and proceed with our analysis; but we keep in mind
that there could be some short-term instability.
Next, we apply an augmented Dickey-Fuller test to Zt; the Federal Funds rate variable. We
do not reject the unit root null, whereas the same test run on the ￿rst di⁄erences does reject
35Figure 1: Recursive log likelihood function. The baseline sample is 2002:12 - 2007:12
the unit root null at the 1% level. Taken at face value, these results suggest that ￿Zt ￿ I(0)
and that we are in the world of either P control or PI3 control.
We now investigate whether ￿Zt is collinear with ￿Yt and Yt. The R2 of this regression is
0:151, so we conclude that collinearity of the policy instrument with ￿Yt and Yt is not an issue.
On the other hand, this somewhat low R2 suggests that the control equation may not be fully
capturing the Fed￿ s behavior. Below, we investigate this further. By running the ￿Zt regression
with ~ ￿t in place of Yt; we can easily test P control vs. PI3 control. The coe¢ cient on ~ ￿t is
strongly signi￿cant (p < :001), so we reject the P control hypothesis.
Following the process described in section 7.2, we next test policy e⁄ectiveness by testing
whether B12 is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. We proceed in two di⁄erent ways. First, we
estimate the open-loop target system (24) using the method of Johansen (1995). Table 2 reports
the relevant results based on White (1980) robust standard errors. As the table shows, the
estimates of B12 are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for both the IPI and the unemployment
variables, and are borderline signi￿cant for the oil price variable. On the other hand, altering
the Fed Funds rate in an attempt to directly a⁄ect the change in the in￿ ation rate would appear
to be ine⁄ective, as the insigni￿cant coe¢ cient in the in￿ ation equation implies. Nevertheless,
indirect e⁄ects arise from the various feedforward channels, i.e., through unemployment and IPI.
36Target variable Coe⁄ Std Err t-stat p-value
IPI total 0.025 0.006 4.279 0.000
In￿ ation 0.215 0.363 0.591 0.555
Unemployment -0.147 0.029 -5.035 0.000
Cushing oil price 0.186 0.107 1.733 0.084
Table 1: Open loop estimates for the matrix B12. Results are obtained by applying the Johansen
(1995) procedure. The computed standard errors are White (1980) robust standard errors.
Target variable Coe⁄ Std Err t-stat p-value
IPI total 0.024 0.006 4.275 0.000
In￿ ation 0.214 0.363 0.590 0.556
Unemployment -0.147 0.029 -5.034 0.000
Cushing oil price 0.186 0.107 1.737 0.084
Table 2: Open loop estimates for the matrix B12. Results are obtained by OLS regression of
￿Yt on a constant, ~ ￿t￿1 ￿ ~ ￿
0
1Yt￿1 = ￿t￿1; ￿Yt￿1; and ￿Zt￿1; where ~ ￿t￿1 is estimated using
the estimate of ~ ￿1 obtained from (26). The computed standard errors are White (1980) robust
standard errors.
Alternatively, we estimate B12 by OLS regression of ￿Yt on a constant, ~ ￿t￿1 ￿ ~ ￿
0
1Yt￿1 =
￿t￿1; ￿Yt￿1; and ￿Zt￿1; where ~ ￿t￿1 is estimated using the estimate of ~ ￿1 obtained from the
closed loop equation (26). As is immediately apparent from the tables, the results from this
second estimation strategy are substantially the same as before.
Next, we test e ￿1 = ￿1. As described above, we can test this hypothesis by applying the
Johansen (1995) procedure to reestimate the target system (24) with the RHS variables aug-
mented to include ~ ￿t￿1 ￿ ~ ￿
0
1Yt￿1: We test whether the cointegrating rank in this augmented
regression is zero using Johansen￿ s (1995) trace statistic test. We cannot reject the zero-rank
hypothesis at the 10% level, so there is no evidence of misspeci￿cation on this basis.
We also examine the estimated residual ￿rst-order autocorrelations of the closed-loop system
(26) and the open-loop target system (24), as a diagnostic for exogeneity of (Yt￿1;￿Yt￿1;￿Zt￿1).
Overall, these do not indicate any obvious problems. For the closed-loop system these coe¢ cients
are ￿0:0152 (IPI), 0:0659 (in￿ ation), ￿0:0304 (unemployment), and ￿0:0062 (oil). For the open-
loop target system, these are ￿0:0018 (IPI), 0:0667 (in￿ ation), ￿0:0546 (unemployment), and
￿0:0044 (oil).
On the other hand, the estimated autocorrelation coe¢ cient for the control equation is
:340; suggesting some form of misspeci￿cation, dynamic or otherwise. To see whether a simple
autocorrelation adjustment can resolve matters, we apply the Cochrane-Orcutt technique to
(25). The result is an estimated autocorrelation coe¢ cient of :527 and very di⁄erent coe¢ cient
estimates. As there is no lagged dependent variable in the control equation, this outcome
37suggests that more than simple autocorrelation may be at work. Plausibly, there may be one or
more omitted variables.
To keep the scope of our example manageable, we just examine the possibility that instead
of PI3 control, the policymaker is executing PI3-derivative (PI3D) control, in which case a
previously omitted term ￿2Yt appears in the control equations5, so that (25) is modi￿ed to
￿Zt = b2 + B20￿Yt + B21￿2Yt + D2Yt + ￿2t t = 1;2;::: (28)
When we estimate the PI3D control equation, we ￿nd that the R2 increases from :151 to :298:
This marked increase is due mainly to ￿2Yt terms associated with in￿ ation and unemployment;
at face value, these terms have a clear role to play. On the other hand, residual autocorrelation
drops to :289: This is a move in the right direction, but clearly PI3D control is not the whole
story. Applying Cochrane-Orcutt to (28), we ￿nd an estimated autocorrelation coe¢ cient of
:380: Encouragingly, the signs and magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients in this equation,
while di⁄ering somewhat from the OLS estimates, do not change nearly as much as they did when
considering only PI3 control. In particular, we reject the PD control hypothesis in favor of PI3D.
In line with our illustrative intent, we proceed by assuming PI3D control with autocorrelated
errors. We further investigate this equation below, however.
PI3D control also modi￿es the closed-loop system (26) to include a ￿2Yt term. We refer
to this as the "closed-loop PID system." Note that our prior omission of the ￿2Yt term could
explain the apparent short-term instability earlier found by the Juselius test. Indeed, when we
re-run the Juselius test on the closed-loop PID system, we ￿nd no evidence at all of instability;
the maximum value for the X version of the test is only about 1:06: That for the R1 form is
smaller. We also ￿nd a very similar value for the cointegrating vector.
Next, we perform tests to explore whether (24), (28), or the closed-loop PID system are linear
or whether there may be neglected nonlinearity. These tests are essentially those described in
WL, section 5. The idea is to augment the regressors in a given equation with neural network
terms, as in White￿ s (2006b) QuickNet procedure, and then test whether the coe¢ cients of the
neural network terms are all zero. This class of tests has been found to have good power to
detect neglected nonlinearity. More speci￿cally:
￿ for equation (24), we construct a Wald statistic for each equation h = IPI, in￿ ation,
5As can be readily veri￿ed, the addition of D control has no impact on the cointegration results of the previous
section.
38unemployment, oil price, to test the joint hypothesis ￿11h = ￿12h = ::: = ￿1kh = 0 in:
￿Yth = b1h + D￿
1h￿0







1Yt￿1 + ￿12hj￿Yt￿1 + ￿13hj￿Zt￿1
￿
￿1jh + "1th
￿ for equation (28), we construct a Wald statistic to test the joint hypothesis ￿21 = ￿22 =
::: = ￿2k = 0 in:
￿Zt = b2 + B20￿Yt + B21￿2Yt + D￿
2~ ￿
0






￿20j + ￿21j￿Yt + ￿22j￿2Yt + ￿23j~ ￿
0
1Yt + ￿24j^ "2;t￿1
￿
￿2j + "2t (30)
￿ for the closed-loop PID system, we construct a Wald statistic for each equation h = IPI,
in￿ ation, unemployment, oil price, to test the joint hypothesis ￿31h = ￿32h = ::: = ￿3kh = 0
in:
￿Yth = c1h + ~ ￿1h~ ￿
0






￿30j + ￿31j~ ￿
0
1Yt￿1 + ￿32j￿Yt￿1 + ￿33j￿2Yt￿1
￿
￿3jh + ￿1th:
In these regressions, ￿1 and ~ ￿1 are replaced by their estimates. Estimated lagged errors
^ "2;t￿1 are included in (30) to accommodate the autocorrelation of the control equation error
terms.
The function G is an activation function from the class of generically comprehensively re-
vealing (GCR) functions (see Stinchcombe and White, 1998). We use a ridgelet function,
G(x) =
￿






. Other examples of GCR functions include logistic
cdf, normal pdf, etc. We call terms involving G ￿hidden unit￿terms, consistent with the arti￿-
cial neural network literature. The integer k indicates the number of included hidden units and
controls the allowed degree of nonlinearity. We choose ￿￿ s from a set of candidates, constructed
as in Huang and White (2009). The algorithm to select the ￿￿ s follows the QuickNet procedure
described in White (2006b).
Tables 3-5 show the Wald statistic p￿values for each equation and each k. BH denotes the
Bonferroni￿ Hochberg adjusted p￿values (Hochberg 1988). The right lower corner element is the
BH p￿value for the panel as a whole.
The stark message from these tests is that the target and control system equations are all
misspeci￿ed, with the apparent exception of the unemployment target equation. Not surpris-
ingly, then, the closed loop PID equations are also found to be misspeci￿ed. Clearly, simple
39k 1 2 3 4 5 Row BH
￿ IPIt 0.004823 0.000764 0.002111 0.003855 0.002843 0.003821
￿ In￿ ationt 0.231894 0.262284 0.099672 0.091767 0.010387 0.051933
￿ Unemploymentt 0.395854 0.514657 0.222053 0.235633 0.15057 0.514657
￿ Oil pricet 0.084189 0.053384 0.059099 0.039732 0.012985 0.064924
Col BH 0.019293 0.003057 0.008445 0.015419 0.011372 0.015284
Table 3: Misspeci￿cation tests for the target subsystem
k 1 2 3 4 5 Row BH
￿Zt 0.111215 0.004651 0.001902 0.001546 0.000225 0.001126
Table 4: Misspeci￿cation tests for the PID control equation
linear structures do not adequately capture important features of the data. Thus, research can
be productively directed toward examining the adequacy and implications of more ￿ exible spec-
i￿cations, such as the neural network speci￿cations forming the basis for these tests. We leave
this as a topic for future work.
Even though the Juselius (2006) tests accord with structural stability for our system with
PI3D control, it is possible that the nonlinearity tests are detecting shifts in the short-run
structure against which the X form of the Juselius test does not have power. Similarly, if one were
to test for and ￿nd structural shifts in the linear PI3D system using other methods, e.g., those
of Bai and Perron (1998) or HJS, one could well be detecting neglected nonlinearities. Thus,
only after disentangling these possibilities does it make sense to conduct tests for recursivity or
invariance, as discussed above.
To distinguish structural shifts from neglected nonlinearities, one promising approach is to
estimate neural networks of the form speci￿ed above using indicator saturation methods of
HJS. If only neglected nonlinearity were the issue, no structural shifts would be found. If only
structural shifts were the issue, then the ￿ coe¢ cients would be essentially zero. If there were
a mix of shifts and nonlinearities, this procedure would, in principle, permit their separate
identi￿cation and estimation. We leave investigation of such procedures and their application
k 1 2 3 4 5 Row BH
￿ IPIt 0.061583 0.006365 5.99E-05 1.42E-05 7.86E-06 3.93E-05
￿ In￿ ationt 0.009056 0.000503 0.000211 0.000478 3.94E-05 0.000197
￿ Unemploymentt 0.005372 0.006648 0.001038 0.000738 0.000939 0.003113
￿ Oil pricet 0.04323 0.046952 0.057542 0.030044 0.008714 0.043572
Col BH 0.021489 0.002011 0.000239 5.69E-05 3.14E-05 0.000157
Table 5: Misspeci￿cation tests for the closed-loop PID system
40Figure 2: Simulation results for the closed-loop PID system
to future research.
We close this section with a brief examination of the impacts of Fed policy implied by taking
the linear PI3D system estimated here at face value. Speci￿cally, we conduct the experiment of
positively perturbing ￿2;t￿1 in the PID analog of the closed-loop system (27) by three standard
deviations for a single period. We choose a relatively large intervention in an attempt to make the
e⁄ects visually apparent. This amounts to a policy intervention increasing the rate of change of
the Fed Funds rate for a single period, somewhat more than doubling the intercept of the control
equation for that period. Even though the e⁄ect (B12) of the Fed Funds rate is statistically
signi￿cant, Figure 2 shows that the impacts of even this large shock are barely visible, apart
from some initial upward e⁄ects on unemployment. Inspection of the di⁄erences between the
series with and without the intervention show that except for oil, each series experiences an
initial upward impact, declining to an eventual small negative impact. For oil, the impact is
initially negative, but becomes less so, converging to a small negative impact.
419 Summary and Conclusion
One of Clive Granger￿ s long-standing and central concerns was that econometric theory and
practice should have direct value to policymakers. Here, we present a framework for economic
policy analysis that provides a novel integration of several fundamental concepts at the heart
of Granger￿ s contributions to time-series analysis. We work with a dynamic structural system
analyzed by WL with well de￿ned causal meaning. The system contains target and control
subsystems, with possibly integrated or cointegrated behavior. We ensure the invariance of
the target subsystem to policy interventions and thus obviate the Lucas critique using an ex-
plicitly causal partial equilibrium recursivity condition, plausible on informational, behavioral,
and empirical grounds. Policy e⁄ectiveness corresponds to another explicit causality condi-
tion. Identi￿cation of system coe¢ cients holds given conditional exogeneity, an extension of
strict exogeneity distinct from weak exogeneity or its extensions. As we discuss, given condi-
tional exogeneity, Granger causality and structural causality are equivalent. Given structural
non-causality, Granger causality and the failure of conditional exogeneity are equivalent. In
this sense, Granger causality is not a fundamental system property requisite for reliable policy
analysis, but an important consequence of necessary underlying structural properties.
By relying only on correct model speci￿cation and not weak exogeneity, our framework
complements the policy analytic framework of Ericsson, Hendry, and Mizon (1998). As we
show, our approach readily lends itself to analysis of the structural consequences of a variety of
control rules that the policymaker may employ. Among other things, we ￿nd that proportional
(P) control cannot modify the cointegrating properties of a target system, whereas proportional-
integral (PI) control can. In fact, PI control can introduce, eliminate, or broadly modify the
cointegrating properties of the uncontrolled target system. Whereas cointegration between target
variables and policy instruments is possible but unusual with P control, PI control can easily
induce causal cointegration between the target (Yt) and the policy instruments (￿Zt). These
properties are preserved under PID control.
The control mode also has interesting implications for estimation, inference, and speci￿cation
testing in controlled systems. P, PI3, or PI3D control yield ￿Zt ￿ I(0); which results in standard
inference. Other modes of PI or PID control yield ￿Zt ￿ I(1); the theory of Park and Phillips
(1988,1989) applies to these cases.
One of the hallmarks of Clive Granger￿ s work is that it has vigorously stimulated research,
often in an astonishing number of di⁄erent productive directions. Putting a positive spin on
the fact that the analysis here leaves a potentially embarrassing number of questions asked but
not answered, we are hopeful that, like Clive￿ s work, these unanswered questions will stimulate
42interest in pursuing and resolving them. In addition to suggesting the relevance of new theory for
inference in partially nonstationary systems with covariates and conditional heteroskedasticity,
the analysis here suggests, among other things, opportunities for developing speci￿cation tests
distinguishing structural shifts and neglected nonlinearities, for studying control of nonlinear
systems with cointegration using a misspeci￿ed model, for studying covariates in control, for
developing methods useful for real-time monitoring of structural change in cointegrated systems,
and for analyzing recursive methods of adaptive policy control, robustly able to operate in
cointegrated systems subject to exogenous structural shifts. We hope, also, that the practical
methods described and illustrated here will, as Clive would have desired, have direct value to
policymakers.
10 Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1 Su¢ ciency of B10 = 0 is immediate.












Given (4), we have
~ A1 + B10 ~ A2 = ~ B1:
Then ~ A1 = ~ B1 for all ~ B1 implies that ~ A1 = ~ B1 for all ~ B1 such that ~ B has full row rank.
For all such ~ B1; ~ A1 + B10 ~ A2 = ~ B1 implies B10 ~ A2 = 0; or equivalently that B10￿2 ~ B = 0:
Because ~ B has full row rank, it follows that B10￿2 = 0: The existence of ￿ ensures that ￿2 has
full row rank. It follows that B10 = 0: ￿
Proof of Proposition 3.1: This is an immediate corollary to theorem 4.3 of WL, with the
assignments Y1;t , Yt; Y 1;t￿1 , (Yt￿1;Yt￿2); Y 2;t￿1 , (Zt￿1;Zt￿2); Xt , Wt; and U1;t ,
"1t: The assumption (9), i.e., (Zt￿1;Zt￿2) ? "2t j (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt); is Assumption C.2 of WL.
We also use the fact that for structures separable in "1t; such as (1), direct structural non-
causality (Y 2;t￿1
d
6)S(Y 1;t￿1;Xt) Y1;t in WL￿ s notation) is equivalent to A112 = 0 and A122 = 0
(￿t(Y t￿1;Zt) = ~ ￿t(Y 1;t￿1;Zt)). See WL, p.219. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3.2: This is an immediate consequence of corollary 6.2 of WL. We
give the proof for (i): That for (ii) is similar. If (Zt￿1;Zt￿2) ? "1t j (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt); then
(Zt￿1;Zt￿2) ? ("1t;Yt￿1;Yt￿2) j (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt) by lemmas 4.1 and 4.2(i) of Dawid (1979)
(D79). If A112 = 0 and A212 = 0; then Yt = ￿01+A111Yt￿1+A121Yt￿2+"1t: That (Zt￿1;Zt￿2) ?
43Yt j (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt) now follows from D79 lemma 4.2(i). If (Zt￿1;Zt￿2) ? Yt j (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt);
then (Zt￿1;Zt￿2) ? (Yt;Yt￿1;Yt￿2) j (Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt) by lemmas 4.1 and 4.2(i) of D79. If
A112 = 0 and A122 = 0; then "1t = Yt ￿ (￿01 + A111Yt￿1 + A121Yt￿2): That (Zt￿1;Zt￿2) ? "1t j
(Yt￿1;Yt￿2;Wt) now follows from D79 lemma 4.2(i). ￿
Attaining a composite policy objective with N1 > N2
Consider PI control of a system with open-loop cointegration when N1 > N2; i.e., there are more
targets than instruments:
￿Yt = b1 + ￿1￿0
1Yt￿1 + B11￿Yt￿1 + B12￿Zt￿1 + ￿1t
￿Zt = b2 + B20￿Yt + D2Yt t = 1;2;:::;
where D2 is N2 ￿ N1: The closed-loop system is given by
￿Yt = b1 + ￿1￿0
1Yt￿1 + B11￿Yt￿1 + B12(b2 + B20￿Yt￿1 + D2Yt￿1) + ￿1t
= b1 + B12b2 + (￿1￿0
1 + B12D2)Yt￿1 + (B11 + B12B20)￿Yt￿1 + ￿1t
= b1 + B12b2 + ~ ￿1~ ￿
0





1 + B12D2 = U￿V0
= U￿1=2S S0￿1=2V0;
with ~ ￿1 ￿ U￿1=2S and ~ ￿1 ￿ V￿1=2S: Here, we apply the singular value decomposition as in the
main text.
This system is cointegrated, provided ￿1￿0
1 + B12D2 has rank less than N1: This is possible
but not guaranteed, as B12D2 has at most rank N2 < N1: The policymaker thus has some
latitude to modify the cointegrating properties of the open-loop target system, but because
N2 < N1 there is less freedom than in the N2 ￿ N1 case. We proceed under the assumption that
the policymaker can choose D2 to attain a cointegrated closed-loop system with cointegrating
rank ~ r. P control obtains as the special case where D2 = 0:
The derivations of Section 6.2 apply directly to give ~ ￿
0
1￿o = 0 and
K ￿o = ko; (32)
where
K ￿ I ￿ ~ J1(B11 + B12B20) and ko ￿ ~ J1(b1 + B12b2);




1; as these derivations do not depend on the relative dimensions of
N1 and N2:
Now suppose that the policymaker seeks to attain a composite goal of the form
H E(￿Yt) = H ￿o = ho;
where H (N2 ￿ N1) and ho (N2 ￿ 1) are chosen by the policymaker. This objective may be
feasible, as the goal has as many elements as there are policy instruments.
This approach represents the policymaker￿ s willingness to trade o⁄ di⁄erent components of
its target goals. For example, it might be willing to accept higher unemployment to attain lower
in￿ ation or vice-versa, recognizing that the available policy instruments do not permit achieving
both lower in￿ ation and lower unemployment.
To see how this goal could be achieved, it is helpful to consider the rows Hi of H one at a
time. First, note that whenever Hi belongs to ~ B1 = span(~ ￿1) (the set of all linear combinations
of ~ ￿1; i.e., ~ ￿1￿; where ￿ is ~ r ￿ 1); then the only feasible value for the corresponding hoi is
zero. If Hi ￿o = 0 is indeed a goal for the policymaker, further control (beyond attaining ~ ￿1)
is unnecessary, as the system will always tend to this value. The policymaker can in￿ uence the
speed of convergence to the goal by manipulating B20; but here this is a secondary consideration.
Instead, the policymaker can focus attention on achieving policy goals represented by choices
Hi belonging to ~ B?
1 ; the subspace of RN1 containing vectors with a component orthogonal to
~ ￿1: With N2 instruments, the policymaker can specify N2 ￿ N1￿~ r such choices. To be feasible,
these must be consistent with (32), so Hi and hoi must satisfy
Hi = ￿0
iK and hoi = ￿0
iko
for some N1 ￿ 1 vector ￿i. For such a ￿i to exist, it is necessary and su¢ cient that
rk(K0;H0
i) = rk(K0);
(e.g., Hadley, 1961), which is straightforward to check. For simplicity, suppose that for a given
B20 there are N2 linearly independent such ￿i￿ s. Stacking the rows Hi gives
H = ￿0K;
where ￿ is an N1￿N2 matrix whose elements are functions of K and H: Because the policymaker
can also adjust B20 (modifying K), there is typically su¢ cient ￿ exibility to ensure that this holds.
If there is no such combination of ￿ and B20; then the policy goal is not feasible for the given
choice of D2 (and the resulting value for ~ ￿1). If the policymaker is willing to modify D2; even
this need not be an obstacle.
45Given ￿; the policymaker can attain ho by solving ho = ￿0ko for b2: The solution is
b2 = (￿0 ~ J1B12)￿1(ho ￿ ￿0 ~ J1b1):
Note that ~ J1 has rank N1￿~ r; but because N2 ￿ N1￿~ r; the nonsingularity of ￿0 ~ J1B12 is plausible.
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